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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON HEALTH AND EDUCATION ECONOMICS    
 
BY 
ISHTIAQUE FAZLUL 
 
August 2020 
Committee Chair: Dr. James Marton 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation evaluates the impact of various institutions and policies on health and 
educational outcomes.  
The first chapter estimates the effect of a school stipend program for girls’ education in 
Bangladesh on the health of their children. For this study, I use five rounds of a repeated cross-
sectional survey, which has a rich set of objectively measured child height and weight information. 
Using the geographic and cohort variation of the program implementation, I find that the stipend 
program led to a lower probability of stunting as well as higher height for age and weight for age 
for the children of the stipend-eligible women. The effects are larger for first births and larger still 
for women who were induced by the program to acquire more years of schooling.  
The second chapter, co-authored with Todd Jones and Jonathan Smith, explores the 
phenomena of taking an Advanced Placement (AP) course but not the exam. Using data from four 
large school districts in the metro Atlanta area, we find that 15 percent of the AP courses do not 
 
 
lead to an exam. Traditionally disadvantaged populations have higher rates of missing the AP 
exam. Using a rich set of individual-level academic and demographic variables, we predict that a 
large portion of these courses would lead to a credit-granting score (3 or higher) if the exams were 
taken. We find evidence that students are more likely to take the AP exam when school districts 
offer a more generous AP exam subsidy. We find no evidence that a female AP student being 
paired with a female teacher leads to higher rates of exam-taking, even for courses where females 
are underrepresented.  
The third chapter, co-authored with Charles Courtemanche, James Marton, Benjamin 
Ukert, Aaron Yelowitz, and Daniela Zapata, estimates the effect of the major components of ACA 
on various types of insurance coverage during the first two years of the Trump administration 
(2017 and 2018). During this time, the implementation of different components of the ACA that 
would impose a burden have been tabled, budgets for outreach have been cut, and a vote to repeal 
the ACA narrowly failed. All of these things may have affected the impact of the ACA on 
insurance coverage during 2017 and 2018. In non-expansion states, which should be impacted by 
the national components of the ACA alone, we see statistically significantly smaller coverage 
increases in 2017 and 2018 as compared to 2016. In expansion states, which should be impacted 
both by the national components of the ACA and the Medicaid expansion, we estimate similar 
gains in coverage in 2016 through 2018. This difference between expansion and non-expansion 
states is due to smaller year over year increases in coverage because of the national components 
of the ACA and larger year over year increases because of the Medicaid expansion.  
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Introduction 
 
Health and education are two of the most critical components of human capital that lead to 
higher income and wellbeing. Policies and institutions that affect health and education can have 
far-reaching consequences in improving quality of life. This dissertation includes three papers that 
explore how three different policy interventions and institutions concerning education and health 
affect various relevant outcomes. 
The policy interventions and institutions explored in this dissertation affect access to 
education and health care. The first chapter evaluates the effect of a secondary school stipend 
program for rural girls in Bangladesh. This program was originally designed to improve access to 
education for girls in the rural areas of Bangladesh who had low secondary school-participation 
rates even among girls (girls had a lower secondary school enrollment compared to boys) before 
the intervention in 1994. The stipend program was designed to increase girls’ years of schooling, 
delay their marriage, and increase their labor market participation.  Existing literature shows that 
it succeeded in all these primary goals. In this chapter, I estimate how this program affects the 
health of the children of its recipients. The second chapter of this dissertation explores AP exam-
taking behavior and the relationship of AP subsidy policies and teacher demographics (specifically 
AP teacher and student gender match) with exam taking. The AP program in general and the two 
policy aspects evaluated (subsidy and gender match) are interventions designed to improve access 
to education. Finally, the program evaluated in the third chapter of this dissertation is the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA is a multi-pronged intervention that includes Medicaid 
expansions, insurance market reforms, subsidized Marketplace coverage, and an individual 
mandate with the primary aim of increasing insurance coverage.  
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The outcomes analyzed include both intermediate as well as final outcomes. Outcomes 
such as lower childhood stunting, improved height for age and weight for age in a developing 
country are desirable outcomes by themselves. On the other hand, taking the AP exam after taking 
AP courses or increases in insurance coverage are intermediate steps to achieving other desirable 
goals. There is existing literature showing that earning college credit while in high school is related 
to performance in college and college graduation (Dougherty, Mellor, and Jian, 2006; Morgan and 
Klaric, 2007; An, 2012; Allen and Dadgar, 2012; Patterson and Ewing, 2013) and higher 
probability of graduating college in four years (Smith, Hurwitz, and Avery, 2017). There is also 
evidence that health insurance coverage leads to more healthcare utilization (Manning, 1987; 
Baickeret al., 2013) and better health (Brook et al., 1983; Finkelstein et al., 2013). 
In the first chapter, I examine the effect of an educational intervention designed to increase 
girls’ years of schooling on their children’s health. The educational intervention used in this study 
is a secondary school stipend program for rural girls in Bangladesh. The second generation’s 
outcome measures considered are stunting, wasting, the prevalence of being underweight, and the 
corresponding z scores for children under the age of five. To solve the endogeneity problem in the 
relationship between mother’s education and child health, I use the mother’s birth cohort and 
geographic variation in program implementation in a difference in differences framework. I find 
that one more year of mother’s eligibility for the stipend program decreases the probability of her 
child being stunted by one percentage point (2.3 percent). One more year of eligibility for the 
program also leads to 0.031 and 0.016 standard deviation increase in height for age and weight for 
age, respectively. Using mother’s years of eligibility as an instrument for her years of schooling, I 
present evidence that for those who were induced by the stipend program to acquire more 
education, one more year of mother’s schooling leads to a 3.6 percentage point (8.4 percent) 
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decrease in the child’s probability of stunting. The paper advances the literature by presenting 
evidence of an intergenerational effect of education in a developing country and also by 
considering a broader definition of child health compared to birth-weight or infant mortality. 
In the second chapter, we explore the phenomena of taking Advanced Placement (AP) 
courses but not taking the exams, investigate if the students are “leaving credit on the table” by 
doing so, and identify some of the possible determinants of this behavior. Advanced Placement 
program (AP) gives high school students in the US an opportunity to take college-level courses 
and get college credit for them. In general, a student first takes the corresponding AP course, which 
helps prepare him/her to take the AP exam and provides knowledge in its own right. In order to 
gain the full benefit of AP, though, the student needs to take and pass the AP exam. The exam, if 
passed, provides college credit, making it easier for the student to graduate college (Smith, 
Hurwitz, and Avery, 2017). Given this and other potential benefits, students who take the AP 
course and are predicted to pass the AP exam are likely leaving something on the table if they do 
not take the exam. Using data from four metropolitan Atlanta public school districts, we find that 
15 percent of AP courses do not result in an AP exam. There are substantial disparities in AP 
exam-taking rates. White, Asian, and non-Hispanic students’ AP courses do not result in an AP 
exam 13, 10, and 15 percent of the time, respectively, while Black and Hispanic students’ AP 
courses do not result in an AP exam 23 and 18 percent of the time, respectively.  We estimate that 
up to 32 percent of the AP courses that do not result in an AP exam would result in a score of 3 or 
higher, which generally commands college credit at colleges and universities across the country. 
We then turn to several explanations as to why students seemingly leave college credit on the table.  
We find evidence that students are more likely to take the AP exam when school districts offer 
more generous funding.  In fact, free and reduced price lunch (FRL) students in the districts that 
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more generously subsidize FRL students are 3 percentage points more likely to take an AP exam 
than their non-FRL counterparts. We find little evidence that a female student paired with a female 
AP course teacher takes the AP exam at a higher rate as compared to being paired with a male 
teacher, even in courses where female students are underrepresented. 
The third chapter estimates the effect of the major components of ACA (Medicaid 
expansion, subsidized Marketplace coverage, the individual mandate, and changes in the insurance 
market regulations) on various types of insurance coverage during the first two years of the Trump 
administration (2017 and 2018). During this time, the implementation of different components of 
the ACA that would impose a burden have been tabled, budgets for outreach have been cut, and a 
vote to repeal the ACA narrowly failed. All of these things may have affected the impact of the 
ACA on insurnace coverage during 2017 and 2018. We use a difference-in-difference-in-
differences model, developed in the recent ACA literature, to separately identify the effects of the 
national and Medicaid expansion portions of the law. We use data from the 2011–2018 waves of 
the American Community Survey (ACS), with the sample restricted to nonelderly adults. In non-
expansion states, which should be impacted by the national components of the ACA alone, we see 
statistically significantly smaller coverage increases in 2017 and 2018 (3.8 percentage points in 
each year) as compared to 2016, where we estimate a 5 percentage point increase. In expansion 
states, which should be impacted both by the national components of the ACA and the Medicaid 
expansion, we estimate similar gains in coverage in 2016 through 2018 (about 11 percentage points 
in each year). This difference between expansion and non-expansion states is due smaller year 
over year increases in coverage due to the national components of the ACA and larger year over 
year increases due to the Medicaid expansion.  
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One connecting thread in all three chapters in this dissertation is their policy relevance.  
Each of the three chapters addresses a pressing policy issue. Worldwide 149 million under-five 
children are stunted, and 49 million are wasted.1  In Bangladesh, a South-Asian country, 36 percent 
of all under-five children are stunted, and 14.3 percent are wasted.2 WHO’s Global Targets 2025 
includes goals to reduce under-five stunting by 40 percent and wasting to less than five percent.3 
Given the results of the first chapter, increasing mother’s education can be one of the policy levers, 
along with the traditional public health measures, through which these goals can be achieved. 
Earning college credits while in high school is related to numerous positive collegiate outcomes, 
including performance in college and college graduation (Dougherty et al., 2006; Morgan and 
Klaric, 2007; An, 2012; Allen and Dadgar, 2012; Patterson and Ewing, 2013) and higher 
probability of graduating college in four years (Smith et al., 2017). These positive effects of 
successful completion of AP exam likely motivates states such as Georgia, to subsidize at least 
one AP exam for all free and reduced price lunch (FRL) students since 2003. Some Georgia school 
districts go above and beyond this state subsidy, in some cases making all AP exams free for all 
students. By documenting the prevalence of AP exam skipping, as well as possible inequalities by 
race and socioeconomic conditions and exploring possible determinants of this behavior, this study 
helps policymakers understand the nature and extent of the problem. This chapter also shows the 
effectiveness of AP subsidy policy in increasing AP exam taking and thus validates a policy tool 
used by some school districts in Georgia.  
 
1 UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates, March 2019 edition. 
2 National Institute of Population Research and Training [NIPORT] et al. 2016 
3 Reduction of Stunting and wasting is also part of multiple Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets set by 
United Nations in 2015 (SDG 1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 2.1; 2.2; 10.4) (World Health Organization, 2017). 
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Finally, the debate about the future of the ACA continues to be a dominant theme in all 
levels of politics and will feature prominently in the upcoming presidential election. Many states 
are debating an expansion of their Medicaid program under the ACA, especially given the current 
pandemic. All this makes our investigation into the effect of ACA in the first two years of the 
Trump administration policy relevant.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized around the three chapters. 
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1. Inter-generational Effects of Education on Health: Evidence 
from a Secondary School Stipend Program  
1.1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, I explore the inter-generational effects of education on health, exploiting the 
introduction of a secondary school stipend program in Bangladesh. There are multiple possible 
channels through which maternal education can affect a child’s health. For example, maternal 
education may affect child health through income. There is ample evidence of the positive 
relationship between education and income (e.g., Angrist and Keueger, 1991; Ashenfelter and 
Krueger, 1994). Increased income due to more years of education can lead to better nutrition during 
pregnancy. The fetal origins hypothesis literature shows that better nutrition during gestation leads 
to improved child health (Barker, 1990; Almond and Mazumder, 2005; Almond, 2006). Thus more 
education for mothers can lead to healthier children through increased household income.  
Mother's education may also affect child health through maternal health. Grossman's model 
of health production predicts education to have a positive effect on health by improving productive 
and allocative efficiency (Grossman, 1972). Empirical literature validates this prediction showing 
a positive causal relationship between education and own health (Lleras-Muney, 2005; 
Oreopoulos, 2006; Silles, 2009; Braakman, 2011; Clark and Royer, 2013). Also, maternal health 
at birth affects children’s birth weight (Currie and Moretti, 2007; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 
2007; Royer, 2009). Combining the effects of education on a mother's own health and the effect 
of maternal health on child health, we can argue that mothers’ education may have a positive effect 
on child health.  
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Thus, there are separate strands of literature focusing on the relationship between maternal 
education and income, maternal education and maternal health, household income and child health, 
and maternal health and child health. However, there is a dearth of causal evidence quantifying the 
direct relationship between programs that increase mothers’ education and child health. In other 
words, though there is ample evidence on pieces of the story, there is little evidence on the broader 
question of the inter-generational effect of education on health. In this paper, I estimate the inter-
generational effect of education on child health, namely stunting, wasting, and the prevalence of 
being underweight. 
The health outcomes that I consider are stunting, wasting, the prevalence of being 
underweight and the corresponding height for age z score (HAZ) weight for age z score (WAZ), 
and weight for height z score (WHZ). A child is considered stunted, underweight, or wasted if her 
height for age, weight for age, or weight for height are more than two standard deviations below 
the WHO Child Growth Standard Median. Both stunting and wasting indicate poor nutrition or 
repeated infections. Stunting is associated with lower cognition, educational performance, wage, 
and productivity. Wasting leads to an increased risk of death. Acknowledging the severe long-term 
adverse effects of stunting and wasting, WHO’s Global Targets 2025 includes goals to reduce 
under-five stunting and wasting.4 Early childhood malnutrition is one of the biggest healthcare 
challenges the world currently faces. According to the WHO, there were 149 million under-five 
children stunted and 49 million wasted in 2018.5 These numbers make up 22 percent and 7.3 
percent of the world’s under five-year-old population in the world. Under-five stunting and 
 
4 “40 percent reduction in the number of children under-five who are stunted” and “…reduce and maintain 
childhood wasting to less than 5 percent”. Reduction of Stunting and wasting is also part of multiple Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) targets set by United Nations in 2015 (SDG 1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 2.1; 2.2; 10.4) (World Health 
Organization, 2017). 
5 UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates, March 2019 edition.  
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wasting are the most prevalent in South Asia, where 32.7 percent of all under-five are stunted, and 
14.6 percent of all under-five are wasted.6 In Bangladesh, a South-Asian country, 36 percent of all 
under-five children are stunted, 14.3 percent are wasted, and the under-five mortality rate is 3.24 
percent. 7 ,8 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the causal effect of an educational intervention 
designed to increase years of schooling for girls on their children’s health, namely stunting, 
wasting, and prevalence of being underweight. The relationship between a mother’s years of 
schooling and her child’s health is endogenous. Mother’s years of schooling may be correlated 
with factors such as mother’s innate abilities and how career-oriented she is, all of which may be 
correlated with child health. This would lead to omitted variable induced endogeneity problem and 
lead to biased estimates. To solve this problem, I exploit the introduction of a female secondary 
school stipend program in rural Bangladesh. I use mother’s birth cohort and geographic variation 
in the program roll-out in a difference in differences framework. I also estimate the effect of 
mother’s years of schooling on child health using the mother’s years of eligibility for the stipend 
program as an instrument for mother’s years of schooling. My data source is the Bangladesh 
Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from the years 2000, 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2014.  
While there have been a number of studies estimating the causal effect of parent’s 
education on birth-weight (Currie and Moretti, 2003; McCrary and Royer, 2006), infant mortality 
(Breierova and Duflo, 2004; Chou et al., 2010; Grépin and Bharadwaj, 2015), age of marriage or 
pregnancy (Alam, Baez, and Carpio, 2011; Hong and Sarr, 2013; Hahn, et al., 2018) and Fertility 
 
6 UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates, March 2019 edition. 
7 National Institute of Population Research and Training [NIPORT] et al. 2016 
8 UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation. Available in: https://childmortality.org/data and 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT?locations=BDanddisplay=graph 
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(Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz, 2005; Long and Osili, 2008), to my knowledge there has been none 
estimating the effect of mother’s education on under-five stunting, wasting and prevalence of being 
underweight. 
Chou et al. (2010) and Breierova and Duflo (2004) study the effect of parent’s education 
on infant mortality in Taiwan and Indonesia, respectively. Both of these countries had higher rates 
of female education and lower rates of under-five malnutrition at the beginning of the program 
compared to Bangladesh. My study is in a context where the issue of child malnutrition is the most 
pressing. One paper that is set in a country with similarly high malnutrition is Grépin and 
Bharadwaj (2015). It uses the post-liberation change in school attendance rule in Zimbabwe to 
identify the effect of maternal secondary education on child survival. But the paper also notes that 
there were several concurrent social and institutional changes in the healthcare sector in the then 
just-liberated country. This may have biased the results and over-estimated the effect of mother’ 
schooling on child survival. Moreover, their outcome variable is child mortality and not measures 
of child health. Studies that look at broad conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs on child health 
also fail to isolate the effect of mother’s education as the programs have multiple conditions such 
as school attendance, vaccination, and nutrition; some of which may affect child health positively. 
The Female School Stipend Program is a unique CCT in the sense that the primary condition of 
receiving the stipend is to remain in school and does not include other health and nutrition-related 
conditions. 
Hahn et al. (2018) is the only paper that estimates the effect of the Female Secondary 
School Stipend Program (FSSSP), the same program that I evaluate, on second-generation child 
health. It, however, differs from my study in four important ways. First, they only have HAZ, 
WAZ, and WHZ and not stunting, wasting, and the prevalence of being underweight as outcomes. 
11 
 
Unlike HAZ, WAZ, and WHZ, the binary outcomes stunting, and wasting are unambiguously bad 
outcomes. Also, these binary measures are especially relevant margins for the under-five children 
of Bangladesh. Second, they use three survey rounds of BDHS for the years 2007, 2011 and 2014, 
whereas my study uses five rounds of BDHS data from 1999 and 2014. Third, because the effect 
of the program on second-generation child health is not a primary consideration of their paper, 
they don’t test the robustness of these results. 
This paper advances the literature in three ways. First, it estimates the causal effect of a 
program targeted to increase female education on the second generation’s health. Second, it 
estimates the causal effect of mother’ education on relatively understudied, yet important measures 
of child health: stunting, wasting, and prevalence of being underweight. Third, it is the first to 
provide credible causal estimates of the effect of mother’s education on under-five child health in 
a country with a very low level of female education and a high level of under-five child 
malnutrition. 
I find that one more year of mother’s eligibility for the stipend program decreases the 
probability of her child being stunted by 1 percentage point (2.3 percent). The positive and 
statistically significant effect is stable across different specifications, including the addition of 
district by child’s year of birth fixed effect and restricting sample to first births only. One more 
year of eligibility for the program also leads to 0.031 and 0.016 standard deviation increase in 
height for age and weight for age respectively. Using mother’s years of eligibility as an instrument 
for her years of schooling, I present evidence that for those who were induced by the stipend 
program to acquire more education, one more year of mother’s schooling leads to a 3.6 percentage 
point (8.4 percent) decrease in the prevalence of stunting. These effects are more pronounced for 
first births. These results are robust to multiple alternative specifications and falsification tests.  
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My results show that investment in mother’s education leads to positive health effects in 
the next generation. Not including these positive inter-generational effects in the benefit-cost 
calculations of female education programs may lead to an underestimation of the program’s 
effectiveness. The results have implications for policies that encourage female education in 
developing countries and inter-generational effect of female schooling in general.  
1.2. Literature Review  
 
The effect of education on health has been studied extensively in the literature. The 
Grossman model postulates that people produce health by using medical care as an input while 
education, health status, and income affect the production of health by affecting its shadow price 
(Grossman, 1972). Education can improve health by prompting an individual to increase inputs in 
the form of medical care and exercise (allocative efficiency), or more educated people may be 
better and more efficient producers of health using the same amount of inputs (productive 
efficiency). Several causal studies show a convincing positive relationship between education and 
own health (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; Silles, 2009). Fewer studies investigate the 
relationship between the parent’s education and child health, and the results are mixed. Some of 
the studies in developed countries include Currie and Moretti (2003), McCrary and Royer (2006), 
Lindeboom et al. (2009), and Silles (2009) while few such as Lucia Breierova and Esther Duflo 
(2004), Chou et al. (2010), and Grepin and Bharadwaj (2015) explore developing countries. These 
studies are discussed in more detail below. 
1.2.1. Causal Impact of Education on Own-Health 
 
Several studies exploit minimum compulsory schooling laws as a source of exogenous 
variation in years of schooling to identify the effect of schooling on own health. Most of these 
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studies focus on developed countries. Lleras-Muney (2005) uses changes in state compulsory 
schooling laws from 1915 to 1939 as a source of exogenous variation to identify the impact on 
mortality rates using instrumental variable and regression discontinuity designs. Both Oreopoulos 
(2006) and Silles (2009) use the mandatory years of schooling law change in the UK from 14 to 
15 in 1963 and then to 16 in 1973 as sources of exogenous variation in years of education. They 
use eligibility of birth year cohorts as an instrument for mother’s years of schooling and find 
education to improve self-reported health. Braakmann (2011) uses the same schooling requirement 
laws in the UK but finds no effect of education on self-assessed health. Clark and Royer (2013) 
also uses the two British compulsory schooling laws and uses an RD design and also finds no 
evidence of education affecting self-assessed health. 
1.2.2. Causal Impact of Parents’ Education on Child Health 
 
Chou et al. (2010) exploits a Taiwanese law extending compulsory education from 6 to 9 
years in 1968 and the opening of 150 new junior high schools from 1968 to 1973 as an exogenous 
shock to education to identify its effect on infant mortality. The study uses the interaction of 
compulsory years of schooling increase and county-specific new school openings as an instrument 
for years of schooling. They find that an increase in parent’s schooling decreases infant mortality. 
A similar methodology of exploiting the interaction of cohort and intensity of intervention as an 
instrument for years of schooling was used by Breierova and Duflo (2004) to estimate the effect 
of parent’s education on child mortality in Indonesia. They exploit two rounds of a primary school 
construction program during 1973-1974 and 1978-1979. In this case, again, program intensity is 
defined by the number of schools built in each district. They find that an increase in parent’s 
education reduces infant mortality.  
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Osili and Long (2008) apply a similar method to Breierova and Duflo (2004) in Nigeria, 
where they estimated the effect of female schooling on fertility. In 1976, Nigeria introduced a 
nationwide program that provided tuition-free primary education and increased the number of 
primary school classrooms at differential rates in the 19 states of the country. The paper used the 
interaction between the year of birth and program intensity, measured by the per capita amount of 
federal funds given to each state for classroom construction, as an IV for mother’s years of 
schooling. The authors found that an increase in mother’s education by one year reduces fertility 
by 0.26 births. This is relevant to child health because it is hypothesized in the literature that a 
lower number of births is associated with healthier children (Becker and Lewis, 1973).   
Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz (2005) used a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the 
effect of mother’s education and the existence of health centers providing family planning on 
fertility in Indonesia. The paper uses a discrete-time hazard model for age at marriage and 
education level of spouse and a logit model for fertility experience starting at age ten while 
allowing the availability of family planning services in the place of residence when a girl is seven 
and later in her life to have separate effects. They find that the presence of a family planning 
program in a young woman’s area leads to higher educational attainment and lower fertility. The 
authors also find that the effect of higher education on reduced fertility is overestimated if the 
endogeneity of education and marriage is not controlled for. This shows that endogeneity of 
education is crucial to control for if we want to estimate the effect of it on fertility and, by 
extension, child health. 
Most recently, Grepin and Bharadwaj (2015) use variation from age-specific exposure to a 
series of reforms in Zimbabwe (used as an IV) that increased access to education for females to 
identify the effect of maternal secondary education on child survival in Zimbabwe. They find that 
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an extra year of maternal education was associated with a 1.7 percentage point decrease in the 
probability that a child was reported to have died before the survey. They also attempt to identify 
channels through which years of mother’s schooling affect child survival by using the same IV. 
Some of the channels they find are a delay in cohabitation, decreased number of births, and 
increased the age at first birth.  
There have been studies investigating the causal effect of mother’s education on child 
health in developed countries as well. Currie and Moretti (2003) examine the relationship between 
maternal education and birthweight among US white women with data from individual birth 
certificates from the Vital Statistics Natality files from 1970 to 2000. They used the information 
on college openings between 1940 and 1990 to construct an availability measure of college in a 
woman’s seventeenth year as an instrument for schooling. McCrary and Royer (2011) use a 
combination of school entry policies and compulsory years of schooling laws as an IV for mother’s 
education to estimate the effect of mother’s education on the probability of low birth weight and 
infant mortality in Texas and California in the US. They do not find any effect of years of mother’s 
education on childbirth outcomes. Grytten et al. (2014) use the Norwegian education reform in 
compulsory years of schooling as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the causal effect of 
mother’s education on childbirth weight. They find that an increase in mother’s years of education 
leads to lower probability of low birth weight. Gunes (2015) uses the increase in compulsory years 
of schooling in Turkey and finds that mother’s primary school completion decreases the likelihood 
of very low birth weight births by 17 percentage points, increases the height for age and weight 
for age by 1.1, and 1 standard deviation. He instruments mother’s years of education with the 
exposure to compulsory schooling law across cohorts. 
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Most of the studies reviewed here estimate the relationship between parent’s (in some 
cases, only mother’s) education and child survival. This outcome is surely the first and one of the 
most immediate inter-generational effects of mother’s education to consider. But survival is a 
narrow definition of health.  To my knowledge, Currie and Moretti (2003), McCrary and Royer 
(2006), Grytten et al. (2014), and Gunes (2015) are the only papers that look at the effect of 
mother’s education on the health of the children who do survive, specifically the prevalence of low 
birthweight. My paper takes the next step by estimating the effect of mother’s education on 
stunting, wasting and prevalence of being underweight of under-five children.   
There have been a few studies evaluating the impact of the Female Secondary School 
Stipend Program (FSSSP) in Bangladesh and another similar program in Pakistan. Most of these 
papers look at the short-run goals of the programs, i.e., school enrollment of females, while some 
look at fertility and age at marriage as outcomes. A number of studies find a positive effect of 
FSSSP on female secondary schooling (Fuwa, 2001; Khandker, Pitt and Fuwa, 2003; Schurmann, 
2009; Hong and Sarr, 2013) increased age of marriage (Hong and Sarr, 2013; Hahn et al., 2018) 
and labor force participation in the formal sector (Hahn et al., 2018). In Pakistan, a similar CCT 
program shows increased female enrollment (Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2006) delayed marriage, 
fewer births, and higher matriculation rates (Alam, Baez, and Carpio, 2011).  
1.3. Institutional Background 
 
Primary schooling in Bangladesh is grades 1 through 5, and secondary school is 6 through 
10. In the 1990s, there was a large disparity between years of schooling of men and women in 
Bangladesh. In 1991, 75 percent of the primary school-aged girls (between 6 and 10 years old) 
were enrolled in a school while 85 percent of boys of the same age were enrolled in a school. The 
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disparity continued in secondary school, where 14 percent of girls between the age of 11 and 16 
were in secondary school, while for boys, it was 25 percent (World Bank, 2003). To address the 
inequality in secondary education in Bangladesh, the Female Secondary School Stipend Program 
(FSSSP) started in 1994 with three stated goals. First, to increase female enrollment and retention 
rates in secondary school. Second, to increase the age at which girls marry. Third, to enhance 
female employment opportunities. The program targeted girls from rural schools only.  
The eligibility criteria for receiving the stipend are that the girl has to (a) have a minimum 
of 75 percent attendance rate at school, (b) have at least a 45 percent score in the annual exam, and 
(c) remain unmarried. The program was rolled out in all rural schools of Bangladesh at the same 
time after a brief pilot period. The annual stipends were equivalent to US$12 in Grade 6, US$13.50 
in Grade 7, US$15 in Grade 8, US$30.25 in Grade 9, and US$36.25 in Grade 10 (Hahn et al., 
2018). These amounts are equivalent to 4 percent to 12.4 percent of the 1994 per capita GDP.9 
Also, a book allowance in grade 9 and an examination fee in grade 10 was available. Tuition fees 
were covered as well, which was paid to the school directly. The cash stipend was paid directly to 
the girls in two annual installments in the form of deposits into savings accounts in the nearest 
bank branch. Not all grades received a stipend from 1994. In 1994 girls in grades 7 and 9 received 
stipends; in 1995, girls in grades 6,7,9 and 10 received stipends, and from 1996 onwards, girls in 
all grades from 6 to 10 received stipends. As a result, mothers born before 1979 (those who were 
supposed to be in grade 10 or higher in 1994) should not be eligible for the stipend program while 
rural mothers born including and after the year 1979 were eligible for 2 to 5 years of stipend.   
Table 1.1 shows the years of eligibility for different cohorts of mothers.  
 
9 All allowance are simple currency conversions and not PPP. 
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Though direct eligibility to the stipend program can be for up to 5 years (grades 6-10), 
indirectly, the duration of exposure may be longer. One can argue that the availability of the stipend 
program in secondary school can positively influence a girl’s family’s decision to send her to 
primary school in anticipation of future stipend. Thus, considering this anticipatory exposure and 
treating it the same way as direct exposure, exposure to the FSSSP can be modeled to be up to 11 
years (grades 1-10). In this paper, I define exposure to be direct exposure, i.e., only the girls in 
rural areas old enough to go to secondary school in 1994 or younger are considered eligible for the 
stipend program and thus are considered exposed to the program. Therefore, when I report the 
effect of one more year of mother’s eligibility to the stipend program, it is the effect of direct 
exposure to the program. This strategy will attribute any differential increase in the number of 
women in secondary school in rural areas compared to urban areas conditional on relevant 
covariates after the intervention to the years of eligibility and will include the effect of any 
anticipatory exposure in the direct exposure estimates.  
The FSSSP supports over 2 million girls each year and consists of 60 percent of the 
secondary school development budget and 13 percent of the total education budget of Bangladesh 
(World Bank, 1997). This makes the stipend program a major undertaking for the country. Just 
above half of the program cost is born by the government of Bangladesh (GOB) and the rest by a 
number of donor organizations. Even though the program has seen a lot of success in increasing 
female schooling and reducing child marriage, there is a push from the donors to change the 
program and make it more targeted by restricting the stipend to only girls whose family is below 
an income threshold. The government of Bangladesh has historically been very much opposed to 
this idea.  
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1.4. Data 
 
The data source for this study is five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey 
(BDHS) collected in 1999-2000, 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2014. BDHS is a nationally representative 
household survey that collects detailed health-related information for mothers and children. It 
includes information on women aged 15 to 49 and men aged 15 to 59. The surveys include 
individual and household level information. One unique feature of the BDHS survey is that the 
surveyors weigh and measures all children in the household under the age of five. This information 
is used to calculate the weight for height, height for age, and weight for age deviation from 
reference median, i.e., HAZ, WAZ, and WHZ. BDHS data also include the binary variables 
stunting, underweight, and wasting that are calculated from the continuous z scores. Calculation 
of the z scores, as well as the binary variables, is explained in the following paragraphs.  
Table 1.2 shows the means of the variables of interest for rural and urban areas of 
Bangladesh for the pre and post 1979 birth-year cohort of mothers. Of particular interest are the 
outcomes stunting, underweight, and wasting. The literature on under-five child health uses WHO-
approved z-scores for height for age (HAZ), weight for age (WAZ), and weight for height (WHZ). 
These scores are comparable across age and sex. The scores are calculated using the following 
formula:   
𝐻𝐴𝑍𝑖 = (ℎ𝑖𝑗 − ℎ𝑗)/𝜎𝑗           
where hij is the observed height of child i in group j, where a group is defined according to a child’s 
sex and birth month. hj and σj are the median and standard deviation of the height in group j, using 
American children as the reference population. HAZi is child i’s height for age standard deviation 
from a reference median. Similarly, WAZi and WHZi are weight for age and weight for height 
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standard deviation from a reference median for child i. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of HAZ, 
WAZ, and WHZ in the BDHS survey sample. All three have a bell-shaped distribution with mean 
smaller than zero.  
According to WHO, moderate to severe stunting, underweight and wasting is defined as 
height for age, weight for age and weight for height being two standard deviations below the 
median of the reference population, i.e., HAZ, WAZ and WHZ being less than -2 respectively. In 
this paper, the binary variables for stunting, wasting, and underweight have been constructed using 
this definition. According to table 1.2, 52.1 percent of under-five rural children in the pre-1979 
cohort of mothers are stunted, while 44.5 percent are underweight, and 14.7 percent are wasted. 
Prevalence of stunting, wasting, and underweight among under-five children is higher in rural 
areas compared to urban areas for the pre-1979 mother cohort. This trend persists in the post-1979 
mother cohort as well, but the difference between the health measures in rural and urban areas 
decreases for the post-1979 mother-cohort. Figure 1.2 suggests a parallel trend in mean years of 
education for the mother in rural and urban areas for the pre-1979 mother cohorts and a shrinking 
gap between rural and urban mothers’ years of schooling in the post-1979 cohorts. Figure 1.3 
suggests a parallel trend in the proportion of children stunted in rural and urban areas for pre-1979 
mother cohorts and a shrinking gap between rural and urban areas for post-1979 mother cohorts. 
This parallel pre-trend is present for the corresponding z score, HAZ. Figure 1.3 suggests less of a 
parallel pre-trend for the proportion of children underweight and WAZ between rural and urban 
populations. Figures 1.4 do not suggest any parallel trends in the proportion of children wasted 
and WHZ between rural and urban mothers among the pre-1979 mother cohort. It is important to 
remember that these graphs do not control for any characteristic of the mother, child, or the 
geographic area and as such, can only be considered as suggestive evidence regarding the 
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relationship between the FSSSP program and second-generation child health. I do a more formal 
test of pre-trend in the form of an event study (see table 1.6) which is discussed in detail in the 
results section. 
The female secondary school stipend program in Bangladesh started in 1994 with girls 
from grades 7 and 9, and by 1996 it included all the girls in grades 6 to 10. The program was rolled 
out in all rural schools at the same time. The geographically non-staggered nature of 
implementation within rural areas is problematic for identification. There are, however, some 
variations that can be exploited such as (i) rural girls born on or after 1979 received stipend for at 
least a year whereas those who were born before 1979 were in 10th grade or higher in 1994 and 
did not receive any stipend and (ii) the stipend program was rolled out only in rural schools. I 
exploit these two sources of variation in a difference in differences design to estimate the effect of 
mother’s years of eligibility for the stipend program on child health. I also examine the effect of 
mother’s education on child health using mother’s years of eligibility for the program as an 
instrument for mother’s years of schooling.   
One shortcoming of the BDHS dataset used in this study is that the mother’s childhood 
place of residence is not available in the data. Due to the lack of availability of this variable in the 
survey data, I will use the urban/ rural classification of the current area of residence instead. 
Justification of this decision is that migration in Bangladesh is overwhelmingly from rural to urban 
areas (Richard Marshall and Rahman, 2013) and consequently, most mothers who currently live 
in rural areas grew up in rural areas as well. Given that the stipend program is implemented in rural 
areas only, the migration from rural to urban areas will lead to an underestimation of any positive 
effect of the program on mother’s years of education and child health.  
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1.5. Methodology 
 
I estimate the effect of a program aimed at increasing female schooling on their children’s 
health. Specifically, I estimate the effect of the female secondary school stipend program (FSSSP) 
in Bangladesh on the recipients’ children’s stunting, underweight, and wasting prevalence as well 
as their height for age, weight for age, and weight for height deviations from reference median (z 
scores). The relationship of interest is represented in equation (i). 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + 1𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑏𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑒𝑗 + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡         (𝑖) 
Here, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡  represents health outcome (stunting, wasting, underweight, HAZ, WAZ or WHZ) for 
child i with birth year t to mother j in district d. ruralj is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the mother j of child i lives in a rural area. 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑒𝑗 is the mother j’s years of schooling, the 
independent variable of interest. 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑏𝐹𝐸𝑗, 𝜇𝑑 , and 𝜆𝑡   are vectors of mother’s year of birth fixed 
effects, district fixed effects, and child’s year of birth fixed effects. Bangladesh is divided into 64 
districts, and each district has both urban and rural areas. In equation (i) the coefficient of interest 
is β3. 
However, due to the possibility of an omitted variable induced endogeneity in the 
relationship between mother’s education and child health, there is no causal interpretation of β3. 
Mother’s years of education may be correlated with an unobservable ability, which also affects 
mother’s nurturing of children and child health. This gives rise to an endogeneity problem 
stemming from omitted variable bias in estimating the effect of mother’s education on child health. 
I address the endogeneity issue by exploiting geographic and birth cohort variation in the eligibility 
for the stipend program in a difference in differences framework. 
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1.5.1. Difference in Differences Analysis 
 
A girl’s eligibility for the stipend program depends on two factors, being born after 1978 
and living in a rural area. This gives rise to a difference in differences identification strategy where 
the treatment group is the rural mothers, and the control group is the urban mothers while the pre-
period is the mother’s birth cohort before 1979, and the post-period is the birth cohort including 
and after 1979.10 Equation (ii) lays out the DID specification for the reduced form relationship. 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + 1𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑏𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 ∗ 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑗 + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡         (𝑖𝑖) 
Like equation (i), 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 represents a health outcome of child i with birth year t to mother j in district 
d. ruralj is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the mother j of child i lives in a rural area. 
MyobFEj, µd, and λt are vectors of mother’s year of birth, district, and child’s year of birth fixed 
effects. elig_yearsj is the years of eligibility for the stipend program of mother j of child i. 
elig_yearsj is determined by the mother’s year of birth. As shown in Table 1.1, mothers born in 
rural areas before 1979 were in grade 10 or higher in 1994 when the program was introduced, so 
they did not receive stipend under FSSSP11. Due to the staggered nature of the implementation of 
the stipend program, rural girls born in or after 1983 received all five years of stipend. Girls born 
between 1979 and 1982 (inclusive) receive varying durations of stipend ranging from 2 to 4 years. 
The variable elig_yearsj will take the value 0 if the mother was born in or before 1978, 5 if the 
mother was born in or after 1983 and 2 to 4 for mothers born between 1979 and 1984 (inclusive). 
The coefficient of interest in equation (ii) is β3, which represents the percentage point change in a 
child health outcome due to one more year of mother’s eligibility for the stipend program for 
 
10 See table 1 for a breakdown of mother’s years of eligibility by birth cohorts 
11 In 1994 girls from only grades 7 and 9 received stipend.  
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binary outcome variables (stunting, wasting, and prevalence of being underweight). β3 represents 
the standard deviation change in a child health outcome due to one more year of mother’s eligibility 
for the stipend program for continuous outcome variables (HAZ, WAZ, and WHZ). The model 
controls for district and child’s year of birth fixed effect. The district fixed effects (µd) control for 
persistent differences between districts in medical technology, availability of family planning 
program etc. while the child year of birth fixed effect (λt) controls for differences in medical 
technology and family planning programs over the years in all districts. Following Currie and 
Moretti (2003), I also estimate a model with a district by child year of birth fixed effect which 
controls for district-specific trends in medical technology, family planning programs and other 
characteristics that may affect child health which does not change my results by much (See 
appendix tables A1.5, A1.6, and A1.7).  
Here identification relies on the fact that the program only affected mothers from rural 
areas and that it only affected mothers in the post-1978 birth cohorts. The identifying assumption 
in this reduced form analysis is that conditional on the controls, if the FSSSP did not take place in 
1994 affecting post-1978 mother birth cohorts, then the health of children born to rural and urban 
mothers would not be trending differently. This means that for the results to be causally 
interpretable, it has to be the case that in the absence of FSSSP, children born to rural and urban 
mothers would have parallel trends in health outcomes, conditional on relevant controls. Though 
there is no way of directly verifying this assumption, we can check if the trend in health outcomes 
of the children of rural and urban mothers born before 1979 are the same. The pre-trend in outcome 
variables, i.e., percentage stunting, percentage wasting, and percentage underweight as well as 
HAZ, WAZ, and WHZ in rural and urban areas in Bangladesh can be seen in Figure 1.3, 1.4 and 
1.5. Figure 1.3 shows parallel pre-trends for stunting and HAZ. A more formal examination of the 
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pre-trend is presented in table 1.6 in the form of an event study. The events study results are 
discussed in detail in the results section.  
This identification strategy is not without shortcomings. If there was a rural area specific 
program to improve child health after 1994 that differentially affected rural and urban child health 
and that differential changed over time, then my estimates may be biased. If such a program 
improved child health, my strategy would attribute the effect of that program to FSSSP. In a 
different context, one solution would be to include rural-by-mother’s year of birth fixed effect to 
control for any time varying characteristics of rural areas with respect to urban areas that affect 
child health. But in this context, such a control variable would absorb all of the identifying 
variation. Nevertheless, any time invariant characteristic that affects rural child health, any district 
specific time invariant characteristic that affects child health, and any time varying national 
component of health care that affects child health are controlled for using rural, district and year 
fixed effects.  
1.5.2. Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
The difference in differences analysis unveils the effect of mother’s eligibility for FSSSP 
on their children’s health but not the effect of mother’s education on child health in general. To 
estimate the effect of mother’s education on child health, I use a mother’s years of eligibility for 
the stipend program as an instrument for her years of education. Here, I follow Currie and Moretti 
(2003) who use college availability on the 17th year of a girl as an instrument for schooling. 
Equations (iii) and (iv) are the first and second stages of a 2SLS design where a mother’s years of 
schooling is instrumented by her years of eligibility for the stipend program.  
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First Stage: 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼1𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑏𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 ∗ 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑗 + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝜆𝑡 +
𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡         (𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
Second Stage: 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + 1𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑏𝐹𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽3Myoej
̂ + 𝜇
𝑑
+ 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡         (𝑖𝑣) 
Here, all the notations from equation (ii) are preserved. The coefficient of interest in this model is 
β3. For binary outcome variables (stunting, wasting, or prevalence of being underweight), β3 
represents the percentage point change in outcome due to one more year of mother’s schooling. 
For continuous outcome variables (height for age, weight for age or weight for height), β3 
represents the standard deviation change in outcome due to one more year of mother’s schooling.   
Just like the difference in differences specification, the IV specification includes district 
and child’s year of birth fixed effect. I also run a version of the model with a district by child year 
of birth fixed effect which controls for district-specific trends in medical technology, family 
planning programs and other characteristics that may affect child health which does not change 
my results by much (see appendix tables A1.5, A1.6, and A1.7). Just like the difference in 
differences case, this more demanding specification generates very similar results to the preferred 
specification with separate district and child year of birth fixed effect. 
For the exclusion restriction to hold, eligibility, which is an interaction between the dummy 
variable ruralj and the continuous variable years of eligibility (elig_yearsj), should influence child 
health only through the mother’s education. But it can be argued that the mother being in a rural 
area may affect child health due to inferior medical service availability compared to an urban area, 
which in turn affects child health. This problem is ameliorated by including a rurali control, which 
absorbs the time-invariant effects of a rural versus urban address of the mother on child health. 
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However, as in the DID model, any time varying differential change in rural health care compared 
to urban health care may lead to biased estimates in the 2SLS strategy as well.  
1.6. Results 
 
Table 1.3 shows the result of naïve OLS regression of child health outcomes (stunting, 
underweight, wasting and the z scores) on mother’s years of education, controlling for an indicator 
for mother living in a rural or urban area, mother’s year of birth fixed effects, child year of birth 
fixed effects and district fixed effects. The naïve OLS shows a negative and significant relationship 
between mother’s years of education and the probability of being stunted, underweight, and 
wasted. An increase in mother’s schooling by one year is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of being stunted, underweight and wasted by 2.4, 2.2, and 0.05 percentage points, 
respectively. A mother’s years of schooling is positively associated with all three z scores. A one-
year increase in mother’s schooling is associated with increases in height for age, weight for age, 
and weight for height of the child by 0.078, 0.068, and 0.031 standard deviations, respectively. 
These relationships, however, may not be causal. An omitted third variable like mother’s ability 
may affect both mother’s years of education and child health. This endogeneity problem will 
render these estimates biased. To solve the endogeneity problem, I use a difference in differences 
strategy to estimate the effect of eligibility for the stipend program on the second generation’s 
early childhood health. 
1.6.1. Difference in Differences 
 
Table 1.4 shows the results from DID model specified in equation (ii). One extra year of a 
mother’s eligibility for the stipend program decreases the probability of the child being stunted by 
1 percentage point, which is equivalent to a 2.32 percent decrease in the probability of being 
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stunted relative to the mean prevalence of stunting of 43.1 percent. One more year of mother’s 
eligibility also increases height for age and weight for age by 0.031 and 0.016 standard deviation, 
respectively. No statistically significant effect of the program was detected on wasting, prevalence 
of being underweight and weight for height z score (WHZ). The fact that mother’s years of 
schooling leads to an increase in WAZ but does not decrease the probability of being underweight 
shows that mother’s schooling influenced child’s weight for age at a margin that does not push 
underweight children above the threshold. Two possible reasons include mother’s years of 
schooling increases weight-for-age of children who are not underweight or increases weight for 
age for underweight children but does not push them above the threshold. More investigation is 
required to check where in the child weight distribution mother’s education has an effect.  
The analysis in table 1.4 does not differentiate between first birth and subsequent births. 
However, first births may be different from subsequent births. First time mothers may be more 
information seeking and may benefit more from education. In later births, lack of schooling or 
information may be substituted by more experience. Running the same model restricting the 
sample to first births only leads to a more pronounced effect of mother’s education on child health. 
Table 1.5 shows that considering only first births, one more year of mother’s eligibility for the 
stipend program leads to 2.3 percentage points decrease in the probability of stunting as well as a 
1.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of being underweight. Also, one more year of 
mother’s schooling leads to 0.075 and 0.052 standard deviation increase in height for age and 
weight for age. So, first births benefit more from a mother being eligible for the program.  
Table 1.6 shows the prep period coefficients from an events study model. This is a formal 
test for the differences in child health trends between rural and urban mothers for mother birth 
cohorts before 1978. In the event study, I run a version of the DID regression model specified in 
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equation (ii) where the "rural*elig_years" variable is replaced with a vector of interactions of 
mother’s birth cohort dummies (from 1965 till 1997) and the “rural” dummy. 1978 is the last birth 
year for mothers before treatment started. I treat 1978 as the base year in this event study by 
omitting it from the regression equation. Since the eligible cohort for FSSSP are mothers who were 
born in 1979 and later, ideally, we want to see no more of the pre-1979 coefficients significant 
than we should expect by chance. As can be seen from the first three columns of Table 1.6, for 
stunting, underweight, and wasting, there are only three significant coefficients out of 39 (7.69 
percent) in the pre-1979 mother cohorts. Moreover, an F-test for the joint significance of all the 
pre-period coefficients for the interactions shows insignificant results for stunting and 
underweight. This indicates that there was no significant difference in childhood stunting and 
underweight trends between the rural and urban samples before the intervention, giving credence 
to the causal relationship between mother’s eligibility to the stipend program and childhood 
stunting and underweight found in tables 1.4 and 1.5. Figure 1.6 shows the result of the event study 
for stunting.  
Looking at columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 1.6, we see 12 out of 39 (31 percent) pre-1979 
coefficients are significant. There are two factors of note here. First, almost all the significant 
coefficients of the interactions are negative, which is the opposite direction of the anticipated 
treatment effect. So there was no upward pre-trend in health outcomes for children of  pre-1979 
mother’s birth cohorts. Second, most of the significant coefficients are in the years 1971, 1974, 
and 1975. Bangladesh became independent after a nine-month-long war in December of 1971. 
1974 was the year of the most catastrophic famine in Bangladesh, which disproportionately 
affected the rural farmers more than the urban population (Mia, 1976; Sen, 1981). Fetal origin 
hypothesis argues that better nutrition during the gestational period affects child health (Barker, 
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1990; Almond and Mazumder, 2005; Almond, 2006). There is also emerging literature that argues 
that health and nutrition inputs to mothers during gestation may affect the birth outcome of their 
children’s children (East et al., 2017). While the famine of 1974 can explain the negative and 
statistically significant coefficients for HAZ, WAZ, and WHZ for the children of mothers born in 
1974 and 1975, the liberation war can explain the negative and statistically significant coefficients 
for HAZ, WAZ, and WHZ for the children of mothers born in 1971. An F-test for the joint 
significance of the pre-period coefficients for all the interactions other than the years of war (1971) 
and famine (1974, 1975) shows insignificant result for HAZ but significant results for WAZ and 
WHZ. This means we can be confident in our results for the effect of mother’s eligibility on a 
child’s height for age z scores. 
The fact that children of rural mothers born in 1971, 1974, and 1975 had significantly worse 
health compared to children of urban mothers born in same years gives rise to the possibility that 
the treatment effect I find in the primary DID specification (table 1.4) is picking up a reversion to 
the mean after the bad child health outcomes from mothers who were born during the war and 
famine. Appendix table A1.8 shows the DID results with the 1971, 1974, and 1975 mother cohorts 
excluded. The results are almost the same as my primary DID results in table 1.4. So a reversion 
to mean does not explain my primary DID results.  
1.6.2. Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
The IV strategy answers a related but different question to the DID strategy. DID estimates 
give us the effect of mother’s years of eligibility for the FSSSP program on child health, which is 
the average treatment effect. The IV estimates, on the other hand, give us the effect of mother’s 
years of education on child health for mothers who were induced by the program to acquire more 
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years of education. The validity of IV depends on the strength of the first stage and the exclusion 
restriction. The strong positive and significant relationship between years of mother’s education 
and years of eligibility conditional on other covariates specified in equation (iii) can be seen in 
table 1.7. Moreover, figure 1.2 shows that the treated (rural) mothers have a steeper trend in years 
of schooling in the post-period (mother birth cohorts after 1979) compared to the pre-periods 
(mother birth cohorts before and including 1978). Table 1.8 presents the result of the 2SLS IV 
design specified in equations (iii) and (iv). One extra year of schooling leads to a 3.6 percentage 
point decrease in the probability of stunting. This is equivalent to an 8.4 percent decrease in the 
probability of stunting relative to the mean prevalence of stunting in the sample of 43.1 percent. 
One more year of mother’s education also leads to 0.11 and 0.06 standard deviation increase in 
height for age and weight for age, respectively. Like the DID specification, I find no statistically 
significant effect of mother’s education on the prevalence of being underweight but a positive and 
significant effect on the weight for age z score (WAZ).  
Estimating the same model with first births only (table 1.9) generates a more pronounced 
effect of mother’s education on child health. Considering only 1st births, one more year of mother’s 
education leads to a 5.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of stunting as well as a 2.4 
percentage point decrease in the probability of being underweight. Also, one more year of mother’s 
schooling leads to 0.16 and 0.11 standard deviation increase in height for age and weight for age. 
So, first births benefit more from an increase in mother’s years of education.  
1.7. Robustness Checks 
 
I estimate several variants of the DID and 2SLS models as robustness checks. The first 
robustness check I do is a placebo treatment time assignment. Instead of 1994, I assume 1988 to 
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be the year the FSSSP program started. The “before” and “after” birth cohorts are pushed back six 
years as well. I treat the birth cohorts from 1973 till 1978 as “after” sample and birth cohorts before 
1973 as “before” sample. In the primary analysis, birth cohorts including and after 1979 were 
considered “after” cohorts and birth cohorts before 1979 were considered “before” cohort. I 
exclude birth cohorts, including and after 1979, which is the true “after” sample. Table 1.11 shows 
that eligibility for the placebo program does not have any statistically significant effect on stunting, 
wasting, the prevalence of being underweight, or the corresponding HAZ, WAZ, and HWZ scores. 
Also, Table 1.12 shows that using eligibility for the placebo program as an instrument for mother's 
years of education, mother’s education does not have any effect on the health of their children. 
These results show that the identification strategy used in this paper is robust to placebo treatment 
time and give credence to the primary results presented in tables 1.4 and 1.8.  
Mother’s age at childbirth is a potential mechanism through which a mother’s education 
can affect child health. There is evidence that more education leads to lower fertility (Osili and 
Long, 2008). Moreover, a lower number of children is associated with healthier children  (Becker 
and Lewis, 1973). Having both mother’s year of birth fixed effect and child year of birth fixed 
effect in the regression models essentially controls for mother’s age at childbirth as mother’s age 
at childbirth is a linear combination of mother’s year of birth and child’s year of birth. To avoid 
controlling for this possible mechanism, I use two different strategies. First, I run alternative DID 
and 2SLS regressions where I substitute the child’s year of birth fixed effect with a survey year 
fixed effect. A survey year fixed effect still controls for existing medical technology, access to 
health care, and other time-variant aspects that may affect child health. However, by avoiding 
controlling for the child’s year of birth fixed effect, I no longer control for mother’s age at 
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childbirth. Appendix table A1.4 and A1.5 show that this alternative specification yields similar 
results to my primary DID and IV specifications (see tables 1.4 and 1.8).  
A second way I avoid controlling for mother’s age at childbirth is by using mother’s years 
of potential eligibility (elig_years) based on her birth cohort instead of the mother’s year of birth 
fixed effect in the primary specification.  This alternate specification is laid out in equation (v) for 
a DID and equations (vi) and (vii) as 2SLS. 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + 1𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽3ruralj ∗ elig_yearsj + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡         (𝑣) 
First Stage: 𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼1𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 ∗ 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑗 + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝜆𝑡 +
𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡         (𝑣𝑖) 
Second Stage: 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜 + 1𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽3Myoej
̂ + 𝜇
𝑑
+ 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑡         (𝑣𝑖𝑖) 
Here, Here, elig_yearsj is years of potential eligibility for the mother. This can take values from 0 
to 5 years, depending on a mother’s year of birth. Appendix tables A1.6 and A1.7 show that results 
from these alternate specifications are similar to my primary DID and IV specifications, as 
presented in tables 1.4 and 1.8.  
1.8. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Child malnutrition and subsequent irreversible effects on cognition, low performance at 
school, and low wages in the labor market is a cycle that may lead to inter-generational poverty. 
Countries have been designing various supply-side (better healthcare facilities, increasing the 
number of antenatal care facilities, increasing the number of trained nurses for childbirth, 
providing family planning services, etc.) and demand-side (information campaign for family 
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planning, hygiene campaign, etc.) interventions to reduce child malnutrition. In this paper, I 
present quasi-experimental evidence on the inter-generational health effect of mother’s education. 
I find that one more year of mother’s eligibility for a secondary school stipend program leads to a 
statistically significant 1 percentage point decrease in the child’s probability of stunting, which 
represents a 2.32 percent decrease in the probability of stunting compared to the mean of 43.1 
percent. One more year of mother’s eligibility for the stipend program also leads to 0.031 and 
0.016 standard deviation increase in height for age and weight for age z scores for the child. Using 
an IV strategy, I find that one more year of schooling for the mother leads to a 3.6 percentage point 
decrease in the child’s probability of stunting. This represents an 8.4 percent decrease in the 
probability of stunting compared to the mean probability of stunting in the sample. Furthermore, 
one more year of mother’s education increases the child’s height for age and weight for age by 
0.11 and 0.06 standard deviation, respectively. The results are robust to a falsification test using a 
placebo treatment time as well as a host of alternative specifications. 
My first stage result, i.e., the effect of the stipend program on girls’ years of schooling, is 
consistent with existing literature. I find that one more year of eligibility for FSSSP leads to 0.27 
more years of schooling. For the full five years of eligibility for the program, a mother’s education 
would increase by 1.35 years. Hahn et al. (2018) found the same program to increase mother’s 
years of education by 1.21 years. Shamsuddin (2015) finds eligibility for FSSSP led to a 1-year 
increase in education level. Yasmin (2016) finds the same program to increase mother’s years of 
schooling by 1.14 years. My first stage results are comparable to some other educational 
interventions as well. My first stage estimate of 1.35 extra years of schooling for five years of 
eligibility to the stipend program is slightly smaller than the effect of being treated in the school 
building project in Zimbabwe (led to 1.68 more years of maternal education) found by Grepin and 
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Bharadwaj (2015) and larger than the effect of one new 4-year college opening per 1000 18-22-
year-olds (led to 1 more year of maternal education by 1 full year) found by Currie and Moretti 
(2003).  
This is the first paper to estimate the intergenerational effects of an educational intervention 
on the recipients’ children’s stunting, wasting, and prevalence of being underweight. I find that 
the full five years of mother’s eligibility for the stipend program leads to 0.155 and 0.08 standard 
deviation increase in a child’s HAZ and WAZ (0.031*5 and 0.016*5). My results are comparable 
to the 0.143 and 0.106 standard deviation increase in HAZ and WAZ estimated by Hahn et al. 
(2018) which investigates the same stipend program in Bangladesh. It, however, use fewer years 
of survey rounds and don’t examine stunting, wasting, and prevalence of underweight. Moreover, 
Hahn et al. (2018) do not provide any robustness check for their intergenerational effects results, 
thus their results regarding child health are open to alternate explanations. My estimates are higher 
than the effect of mother completing primary education on a child’s HAZ and WAZ (1.1 and 1 
standard deviation for HAZ and WAZ) estimated by Gunes et al. (2015). 
Given the effectiveness of mother’s education in improving child health, the cost-benefit 
analysis of the FSSSP in specific and education-related CCTs, in general, should include the long 
run inter-generational health effect of such programs. These results show that mother’s education 
may be an integral part of reaching the WHO Global Targets 2025 and UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG), both of which include goals of lowering childhood stunting world-
wide. 
 
 
36 
 
1.9. Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1.1: Z Score Distributions  
 
 
Note: Height for age, weight for age, and weight for height deviation from the reference median. Data are from five 
rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The sample includes all children 
born within five years before survey. 
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Figure 1.2: Mother’s Years of Education Trend  
                                                           
Note: Mother’s years of education trend by year of birth. Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic 
Health Surveys (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014.  
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Figure 1.3: Stunting and HAZ Trends 
 
Note: Child stunting and height for age z-score (HAZ) trend. Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic 
Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The sample includes all children born within five years before the 
survey. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Underweight and WAZ Trends  
 
Note: Child prevalence of underweight and weight for age z-score (WAZ) trend. Data are from five rounds of 
Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The sample includes all children born within 
five years before the survey.  
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Figure 1.5: Wasting and WHZ Trends  
 
Note: Child wasting and weight for height z-score (WHZ) trend. Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh 
Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The sample includes all children born within five years 
before the survey. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Event Study 
 
Note: Events study for the outcome stunting. The treatment variable “rural” is interacted with the full set of year 
dummies from 1965 to 1997 omitting 1978. The base year is 1978, the last birth year for mothers before treatment 
started. 
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Table 1.1: Defining Treatment and Control Groups 
Grade in 
1994 
Age in 1994 Year of birth for each 
age in 1994 
Years for which 
rural girl 
received stipend 
if at school 
Treatment status 
 ≤ 1  ≤ 7 ≥ 1987 5 Treated 
2 8 1986 5 
3 9 1985 5 
4 10 1984 5 
5 11 1983 5 
6 12 1982 4 Partially Treated 
7 13 1981 3 
8 14 1980 2 
9 15 1979 2 
10 16 1978 0 Control 
11 17 1977 0 
12 18 1976 0 
13 19 1975 0 
≥ 14 ≥ 20  ≤ 1974 0 
Note: This table assumes that a child goes to grade 1 at the age of 7 as is the norm in South Asian countries. 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Full 
Sample 
Rural 
(Treatment) 
Pre-1979 
mother 
cohort 
Urban 
(Control) 
Pre-1979 
mother 
cohort 
Rural 
(Treatment) 
Post 1979 
mother 
cohort 
Urban 
(Control) 
Post 1979 
mother 
cohort 
Outcomes      
HAZ: Height for age 
SD  
-1.742 
(1.392) 
-2.043 
(1.388) 
-1.612 
(1.444) 
-1.733 
(1.349) 
-1.459 
(1.389) 
WAZ: Weight for age 
SD  
-1.637 
(1.139) 
-1.825 
(1.082) 
-1.505 
(1.252) 
-1.664 
(1.098) 
-1.383 
(1.177) 
WHZ: Weight for 
height SD 
-0.915 
(1.131) 
-0.961 
(1.058) 
-0.837 
(1.160) 
-0.961 
(1.138) 
-0.796 
(1.177) 
Stunted12  0.431 0.521 0.395 0.425 0.354 
Underweight 13 0.376 0.445 0.351 0.380 0.296 
Wasted14 0.149 0.147 0.134 0.162 0.132 
Other Variables      
Mother's years of 
education 
4.738 
(4.131) 
2.591 
(3.475) 
5.141 
(5.032) 
5.164 
(3.671) 
6.499 
(4.125) 
Mother's age at 
interview 
26.63 
(5.984) 
31.22 
(5.980) 
31.24 
(5.489) 
23.73 
(4.024) 
24.06 
(3.996) 
Total children of the 
mother 
2.894 
(1.830) 
4.287 
(2.150) 
3.519 
(1.879) 
2.260 
(1.202) 
2.019 
(1.065) 
Mother's age at first 
child birth 
18.07 
(3.192) 
18.23 
(3.512) 
29.38 
(4.256) 
17.56 
(2.551) 
18.22 
(3.012) 
Mother's age at child 
birth 
23.74 
(5.724) 
28.00 
(5.944) 
27.96 
(5.481) 
21.06 
(3.799) 
21.34 
(3.791) 
Marriage to first birth 
interval 
28.30 
(25.200
) 
35.99 
(32.18) 
33.11 
(30.07) 
23.85 
(3.799) 24.76 
(19.99) 
Birth order number 2.661 
(1.776) 
3.990 
(2.128) 
3.300 
(1.845) 
2.036 
(1.140) 
1.844 
(1.003) 
N 29,553 7,368 3,060 13,123 6,002 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. Data are from 5 Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 
1999 to 2014. Sample includes children from mothers that gave birth at ages 16 to 46 and had a child less than 5 
years old on the day of survey.  
 
 
 
 
12 Equals 1 if HAZ<-2 i.e. height is 2 SD lower than standard set by WHO 
13 Equals 1 if WAZ<-2 i.e. weight is 2 SD lower than standard set by WHO 
14 Equals 1 if WHZ<-2 i.e. weight is 2 SD lower than standard set by WHO 
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Table 1.3: Naive OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
-0.024*** -0.022*** -0.005*** 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Rural 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.015** -0.169*** -0.161*** -0.082*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.027) (0.019) (0.022) 
Observations 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 
R-squared 0.106 0.072 0.017 0.145 0.121 0.036 
Note: Data are from 5 Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The sample includes all 
children born within 5 years before survey. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Includes 
mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.4: DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Mother’s years 
of eligibility 
-0.010*** -0.003 0.001 0.031*** 0.016** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Rural 0.106*** 0.081*** 0.018** -0.368*** -0.302*** -0.115*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.040) (0.026) (0.029) 
Observations 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 
R-squared 0.074 0.044 0.014 0.103 0.073 0.026 
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The 
sample includes all children born within five years before the survey. Standard errors clustered at the district level in 
parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 1.5: DID: First Births Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Mother’s years 
of eligibility 
-0.023*** -0.011* -0.001 0.075*** 0.052*** 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
Rural 0.165*** 0.107*** 0.036* -0.564*** -0.470*** -0.183*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.021) (0.065) (0.059) (0.060) 
Observations 10,348 10,348 10,348 10,348 10,348 10,348 
R-squared 0.092 0.058 0.023 0.132 0.107 0.039 
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The table 
includes only the first child born during the five years before the survey. Standard errors clustered at the district 
level in parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed 
effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.6: Events Study: Pre-Trend 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
1965 Cohort × rural 0.050 0.033 -0.059 -0.489** -0.220 0.095 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.051) (0.238) (0.153) (0.157) 
1966 Cohort × rural 0.024 -0.017 -0.077 -0.229 0.078 0.322* 
 (0.056) (0.066) (0.047) (0.183) (0.143) (0.173) 
1967 Cohort × rural 0.079 0.088 0.059 -0.242 -0.208 -0.096 
 (0.084) (0.068) (0.038) (0.236) (0.176) (0.136) 
1968 Cohort × rural -0.025 -0.021 -0.042 -0.182 -0.107 0.007 
 (0.060) (0.064) (0.053) (0.199) (0.180) (0.166) 
1969 Cohort × rural -0.060 -0.030 0.048 0.078 -0.019 -0.148 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.034) (0.129) (0.129) (0.135) 
1970 Cohort × rural 0.062 0.051 -0.048 -0.244* -0.172 -0.049 
 (0.051) (0.054) (0.040) (0.134) (0.125) (0.149) 
1971 Cohort × rural 0.041 0.041 -0.031 -0.341*** -0.206* -0.035 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.035) (0.116) (0.109) (0.116) 
1972 Cohort × rural 0.004 0.007 -0.007 -0.130 -0.129 -0.112 
 (0.045) (0.038) (0.037) (0.128) (0.087) (0.100) 
1973 Cohort × rural 0.012 -0.017 -0.014 -0.138 -0.130 -0.077 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.033) (0.137) (0.101) (0.109) 
1974 Cohort × rural 0.091* 0.063 0.017 -0.355** -0.291** -0.123 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.028) (0.144) (0.118) (0.098) 
1975 Cohort × rural 0.121*** 0.127*** 0.014 -0.363*** -0.307** -0.122 
 (0.036) (0.043) (0.029) (0.114) (0.118) (0.112) 
1976 Cohort × rural -0.043 0.023 0.022 -0.019 -0.046 -0.070 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.031) (0.135) (0.105) (0.096) 
1977 Cohort × rural 0.034 0.069 0.032 -0.222* -0.267*** -0.204** 
 (0.037) (0.046) (0.034) (0.122) (0.098) (0.102) 
F-Test w/o ’71, 
’74, ’75  
1.21 1.13 1.9** 1.68 2.10** 1.78* 
Observations 30,232 30,232 30,232 30,232 30,232 30,232 
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The 
sample includes all children born within five years before the survey. Mother’s year of birth restricted from 1965 to 
1997. Coefficients for the interaction of mother’s year of birth and the binary variable “rural” reported in the table. 
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and 
district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.7: First Stage 
 
 
VARIABLES Mother's years of education 
Years of Eligibility 0.274*** 
 (0.045) 
Rural -2.186*** 
 (0.198) 
Mean Mother's 
years of education 
4.738 
Observations 31,170 
F-stat 2593.52 
Prob>F 0 
R-squared 0.188 
Note: Data are from 5 Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses and clustered at the district level. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth, and district fixed 
effects.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.8: 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
-0.036*** -0.011 0.004 0.113*** 0.060*** -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) 
Rural 0.028** 0.057*** 0.028** -0.121*** -0.172*** -0.141*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.044) (0.034) (0.031) 
Observations 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 
R-squared 0.099 0.065 0.007 0.136 0.120 0.017 
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The 
sample includes all children born within five years before the survey. Standard errors clustered at the district level in 
parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 1.9: 2SLS: First Births Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
-0.051*** -0.024* -0.001 0.163*** 0.114*** 0.021 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) 
Rural 0.020 0.038** 0.032*** -0.098** -0.145*** -0.123*** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.049) (0.031) (0.037) 
Observations 10,337 10,337 10,337 10,337 10,337 10,337 
R-squared 0.085 0.079 0.024 0.115 0.129 0.048 
Note: Data are from 5 Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The table includes only 
the first child born during the 5 years before survey. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. 
Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.10: Naive OLS with Placebo Treatment Time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
-0.026*** -0.025*** -0.006*** 0.082*** 0.071*** 0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rural 0.051*** 0.024** 0.002 -0.181*** -0.132*** -0.031 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) 
Observations 10,428 10,428 10,428 10,428 10,428 10,428 
R-squared 0.117 0.080 0.027 0.153 0.123 0.046 
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The 
sample includes children born within five years before the survey. Instead of the actual year when the treatment 
started (1994) I consider a placebo treatment year, 1988. In this falsification test, mothers born before 1973 are 
considered “before” sample and mother born from 1973 till 1978 are considered “after” sample. For this exercise, I 
get rid of the observations for mother birth cohorts after 1978 which is the true “after” sample. Standard errors 
clustered at the district level in parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed 
effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.11: DID with Placebo Treatment Time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Mother’s years 
of eligibility 
0.001 0.004 0.005 0.013 -0.003 -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013) 
Rural 0.105*** 0.067*** 0.002 -0.383*** -0.278*** -0.074 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.012) (0.061) (0.047) (0.049) 
Observations 10,433 10,433 10,433 10,433 10,433 10,433 
R-squared 0.079 0.043 0.023 0.104 0.065 0.033 
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The 
sample includes children born within five years before the survey. Instead of the actual year when the treatment 
started (1994) I consider a placebo treatment year, 1988. In this falsification test, mothers born before 1973 are 
considered “before” sample and mother born from 1973 till 1978 are considered “after” sample. For this exercise, I 
get rid of the observations for mother birth cohorts after 1978 which is the true “after” sample. Standard errors 
clustered at the district level in parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed 
effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.12: 2SLS with Placebo Treatment Time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
0.013 0.117 0.151 0.375 -0.079 -0.353 
 (0.191) (0.303) (0.253) (0.616) (0.507) (0.808) 
Rural 0.134 0.326 0.337 0.447 -0.454 -0.855 
 (0.405) (0.639) (0.539) (1.331) (1.081) (1.724) 
Observations 10,428 10,428 10,428 10,428 10,428 10,428 
R-squared 0.030      
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The 
sample includes children born within five years before the survey. Instead of the actual year when the treatment 
started (1994) I consider a placebo treatment year, 1988. In this falsification test, mothers born before 1973 are 
considered “before” sample and mother born from 1973 till 1978 are considered “after” sample. For this exercise, I 
get rid of the observations for mother birth cohorts after 1978 which is the true “after” sample. Standard errors 
clustered at the district level in parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed 
effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.10. Appendix 
 
Table A1.1: Naive OLS with Child Year of Birth - District Fixed Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
-0.025*** -0.022*** -0.005*** 0.079*** 0.068*** 0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Rural 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.018*** -0.158*** -0.159*** -0.089*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.028) (0.019) (0.022) 
Observations 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 
R-squared 0.142 0.111 0.056 0.179 0.157 0.081 
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The table 
includes all children born within five years before the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at 
the district level. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth fixed effect, district fixed effect and child year 
of birth by district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.2: DID with Child Year of Birth - District Fixed Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Mother’s years 
of eligibility 
-0.009*** -0.004 0.000 0.028*** 0.019** 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) 
Rural 0.103*** 0.086*** 0.023*** -0.351*** -0.309*** -0.139*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.008) (0.043) (0.028) (0.031) 
Observations 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 
R-squared 0.110 0.084 0.054 0.137 0.111 0.072 
Note: Data are from Mother’s years of eligibility Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 
2014. The table includes all children born within five years before the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
and clustered at the district level. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth fixed effect, district fixed effect, 
and child year of birth by district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1.3: 2SLS_cont_elig with Child Year of Birth - District Fixed Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
-0.031*** -0.014* 0.001 0.094*** 0.063*** 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
rural 0.032** 0.053*** 0.026** -0.137*** -0.166*** -0.117*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.044) (0.036) (0.031) 
Observations 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 
R-squared 0.140 0.108 0.052 0.177 0.157 0.077 
Note: Data are from 5 Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The table includes all 
children born within 5 years before survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the district level. 
Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth fixed effect, district fixed effect and child year of birth by district 
fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.4: DID with Survey Year Instead of Child’s Year of Birth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Mother’s Years 
of Eligibility 
-0.010*** -0.003 0.001 0.031*** 0.016** -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) 
rural 0.105*** 0.081*** 0.018** -0.366*** -0.303*** -0.115*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.043) (0.026) (0.029) 
Observations 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 
R-squared 0.038 0.030 0.010 0.050 0.048 0.019 
Note: Data are from Mother’s years of eligibility Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 
2014. The sample includes all children born within five years before the survey. Standard errors clustered at the 
district level in parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, survey year, and district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1.5: 2SLS with Survey Year Instead of Child’s Year of Birth Fixed Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
-0.035*** -0.011 0.004 0.112*** 0.058*** -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) 
Rural 0.028** 0.058*** 0.028** -0.122*** -0.176*** -0.144*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.042) (0.034) (0.031) 
Observations 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 
R-squared 0.066 0.051 0.003 0.089 0.098 0.009 
Note: Data are from Mother’s years of eligibility Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 
2014. The sample includes all children born within five years before the survey. Standard errors clustered at the 
district level in parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, survey year, and district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
 
 
 
Table A1.6: DID with Years of Potential Eligibility  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Mother’s years 
of eligibility 
-0.010*** -0.003 0.001 0.030*** 0.016** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Rural 0.105*** 0.081*** 0.019** -0.365*** -0.302*** -0.116*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.042) (0.027) (0.028) 
Observations 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 
R-squared 0.067 0.039 0.012 0.093 0.067 0.024 
Note: Data are from Mother’s years of eligibility Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 
2014. The sample includes all children born within five years before the survey. Standard errors clustered at the 
district level in parentheses. Includes child’s year of birth and district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1.7: 2SLS with Years of Potential Eligibility  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
-0.034*** -0.010 0.004 0.107*** 0.057*** -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) 
Rural 0.030** 0.058*** 0.028** -0.127*** -0.176*** -0.140*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.043) (0.034) (0.031) 
Observations 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 31,170 
R-squared 0.094 0.060 0.006 0.130 0.115 0.015 
Note: Data are from Mother’s years of eligibility Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 
2014. The sample includes all children born within five years before the survey. Standard errors clustered at the 
district level in parentheses. Includes child’s year of birth and district fixed effect. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.8: DID Excluding Mother Birth Cohorts 1971, 1974 and 1975  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Mother’s years 
of eligibility 
-0.009*** -0.003 0.001 0.030*** 0.016** -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) 
Rural 0.104*** 0.080*** 0.019** -0.363*** -0.299*** -0.114*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.041) (0.026) (0.029) 
Observations 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 31,200 
R-squared 0.069 0.042 0.014 0.096 0.070 0.026 
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. Excludes 
mother birth cohorts 1971, 1974 and 1975 to test for mean reversion from the bad outcomes of mother birth cohorts 
from the year of liberation war (1971) and the years of famine (1974, 1975). The sample includes all children born 
within five years before the survey. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Includes mother’s 
year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A1.9: Naive OLS: First Births Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Stunting Underweight Wasting HAZ WAZ WHZ 
Education in 
single years 
-0.024*** -0.021*** -0.005*** 0.074*** 0.069*** 0.035*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rural 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.028*** -0.180*** -0.187*** -0.110*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.039) (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations 10,337 10,337 10,337 10,337 10,337 10,337 
R-squared 0.119 0.079 0.026 0.165 0.146 0.049 
Note: Data are from five rounds of Bangladesh Demographic Health Survey (BDHS) from 1999 to 2014. The table 
includes only the first child born during the five years before the survey. Standard errors clustered at the district 
level in parentheses. Includes mother’s year of birth, child year of birth and district fixed effect.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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2. College Credit on the Table? Advanced Placement Course and 
Exam Taking15 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Taking advanced college-level coursework in high school is pervasive across the United 
States. Among the public high school graduates in the class of 2019 nationally, 1,245,527 (38.9 
percent) took at least one Advanced Placement (AP) exam, which is more than a 50 percent 
increase over the last ten years.16 Between the 2002-03 and 2010-11 academic years, the number 
of students taking college-level courses in a dual-enrollment program increased 80 percent to 1.2 
million.17 While there are many arguments in favor of (and in opposition to) such advanced course 
work, one potential benefit is the ability to earn college credit while still in high school. Earning 
college credit while in high school is related to numerous positive collegiate outcomes, including 
performance in college and college graduation (Dougherty et al., 2006; Morgan and Klaric, 2007; 
An, 2012; Allen and Dadgar, 2012; Patterson and Ewing, 2013).  
This paper addresses the simple but novel research question—do students who take 
Advanced Placement (AP) courses take the corresponding AP exams or are they leaving college 
credit on the table? For more than 30 AP courses, students can obtain college credit by performing 
well on the corresponding AP exam at the end of the school year. College credit through AP exams 
causally results in a higher probability of graduating college in four years (Smith et al., 2017). This 
is especially important since many college students struggle to graduate and graduate on time 
(Bound et al., 2010; Denning, et al., 2019). Scoring high enough on an AP exam to earn college 
 
15 This chapter is co-authored with Todd Jones (toddrandyjones@gmail.com), Department of Economics, 
Mississippi State University,  and Jonathan Smith (jsmith500@gsu.edu), Department of Economics, Georgia 
State University 
16 Source: College Board website. Link: https://reports.collegeboard.org/ap-program-results/class-2019-data 
17 Source: National Center for Education Statistics. Link: https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013002/tables/table_01.asp 
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credit also induces more advanced coursework in high school (Smith et al., 2017), more females 
taking upper level STEM courses in college (Gurantz, 2019), and increases the probability the 
student’s college major will be in the AP subject (Avery, et al., 2018). Collectively, taking an AP 
exam and performing well substantially impacts students’ trajectories through college.   
There are a number of reasons students who take an AP course may not take the 
corresponding AP exam, which motivate our analyses. First and foremost, the costs of taking the 
AP exam may outweigh the benefits. The exam fees constitute a direct financial cost, which can 
be as high as $91. Moreover, there may be indirect costs such as time spent studying and sitting 
for the exam as well as psychological costs of a high stakes exam (e.g., Banks and Smyth, 2015). 
All these costs, especially the exam fee, likely motivate states like Georgia to subsidize at least 
one AP exam for students eligible for free and reduced-priced lunch (FRL). Many Georgia school 
districts, including all four we explore, go above and beyond the state subsidy by making some (or 
all) AP exams free for some (or all) students. On the benefit side, students may know they are 
likely to perform poorly on the exam, resulting in few if any benefits (i.e., college credit) and so 
even small costs may outweigh the benefits.  
The second set of reasons students who take an AP course may not take the AP exam stems 
from a mountain of evidence on the behavioral and informational constraints that lead to 
undesirable educational outcomes on the path to and through college.18 On the behavioral side, 
some students are dissuaded by small costs and procedures in the college application process, even 
if the benefits actually outweigh the costs, such as taking the SAT or ACT (Klasik, 2013; Hurwitz 
et al., 2015; Goodman, 2016; Hyman, 2017) or paying a small college application fee and writing 
an admission essay (Smith, et al., 2015). In this context, an exam fee or a three-hour exam may be 
 
18 See Page and Scott-Clayton (2016) for a thorough review of the evidence. 
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sufficient to overlook the benefits of performing well. On the informational side, disadvantaged 
students may not have the same resources, peers, and schools as relatively advantaged students to 
help them navigate educational procedures and decisions (e.g., Bettinger, et al., 2012; Hoxby and 
Turner, 2013; Dillon and Smith, 2017). Here, some AP course enrollees may not know about 
college credit policies or how they can benefit from college credit, should they score high enough.  
Using data from four metro-Atlanta public school districts from school year (SY) 2014-15 
to SY 2016-17, we find that 15 percent of students’ AP course enrollments do not result in an AP 
exam. We also estimate that up to 32 percent of the AP courses that do not lead to exams would 
receive scores of 3 or higher, generally corresponding to college credit. To our knowledge, we are 
the first paper to document these simple results on AP exam-taking rates. This also represents a 
potential actionable policy lever—incentives for students to take the AP exam—that corresponds 
to the massive growth in advanced coursework enrollment over the last decade.  
Motivated by the previously mentioned literature, we also examine AP exam-taking rates 
by different student subgroups and find substantial disparities in AP exam-taking rates between 
traditionally disadvantaged populations and relatively advantaged students. Eighteen percent of 
the courses taken by FRL students do not lead to an exam compared to 15 percent for non-FRL 
students. Black students take an AP course but do not take the AP exam 23 percent of the time, 
compared to 10 and 13 percent for Asian students and White students, respectively. The rates are 
18 and 15 percent for Hispanic and non-Hispanic students, respectively.19 
Next, we estimate multiple linear regressions to assess whether the above unconditional 
statistics on AP exam taking are driven by factors correlated with FRL status and race/ethnicity or 
 
19 Ethnicity and race are not mutually exclusive categories in these data.  
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by those measures in and of themselves. We also investigate potential policy levers to increase AP 
exam-taking rates. We find that after adding a rich set of controls—including AP course grades—
courses taken by FRL students are 2 percentage points more likely to result in an AP exam than 
those taken by non-FRL students. FRL students typically have worse educational outcomes than 
non-FRL students, on average (e.g., Papay et al., 2015), making this an uncommon result in the 
literature. The districts that provide a higher AP exam subsidy for FRL students than non-FRL 
students drive the positive relationship, with courses taken by FRL students being 3 percentage 
points more likely to result in an AP exam. In the districts with high AP exam subsidies but not 
differentially so by FRL status, we see no difference in exam-taking rates by FRL status. Taken 
together and with a series of other analyses, the evidence is consistent with these AP exam subsidy 
policies leading to an increase in AP exam taking for FRL students. These are the very students 
who are targeted by the subsidies and are often subject to financial and informational constraints.  
After adding a rich set controls to our regressions, we still see troubling racial disparities 
in AP exam-taking rates. Courses taken by Black students are almost 4 percentage points less likely 
to take an AP exam compared to their White peers, even when accounting for differences in AP 
course grades, FRL status, and high school enrolled. We also find that courses taken by Hispanic 
students are almost 1.5 percentage points less likely to take the exam compared to non-Hispanic 
students. Our analyses do not provide evidence as to why the Black-White disparity persists in this 
context and find this to be a compelling place for further research and school intervention.  
Next, we turn to analyses on gender; it is possible that AP courses and exams can both 
highlight potentially new measures of gender disparity and serve to exacerbate or reduce 
downstream gender disparities, such as those disparities documented and explored in college major 
and occupation (e.g., Blau and Kahn, 2000; Speer, 2017). We first note that there are gender gaps 
57 
 
in AP course enrollment in our four school districts, despite gender parity in composition of the 
student body. Females comprise of only 22 and 24 percent of the two AP computer science courses 
and 22, 31, and 39 percent of the three AP physics courses. Females are substantially 
overrepresented in AP Psychology and the two AP English courses.  
With these AP course enrollment statistics in mind, we investigate whether there is a lower 
AP exam-taking rate by females, especially in AP courses where female students are under-
represented. We also explore if a female student being paired with female teachers leads to more 
AP exam-taking. Importantly, we do not have random assignment of students into AP courses nor 
is there random assignment of instructors to classrooms, which is how the most compelling 
literature on teacher and student gender match (“role model effects”) proceed, albeit with mixed 
results.20  We find no evidence that females are less likely to take an AP exam, even in AP courses 
where they are the minority. We also find a null effect of a female student being paired with a 
female teacher on the probability of taking the AP exam; we also fail to detect an effect even in 
AP subjects in which females are underrepresented. Although our estimates are not causal, we 
suspect that selection issues for the gender match of the student and instructor would bias our 
results upward, and so a lack of statistically positive coefficients is suggestive evidence against a 
role model effect in AP exam taking. 
Finally, we examine two other factors that potentially affect AP exam taking. First, 
although twelfth-grade students are the least likely grade to take an AP exam, the impact of exam 
 
20 While the effect of having a female teacher on female student’s performance in middle or high school (e.g., 
Ehrenberg et al., 1995; Nixon and Robinson 1999; Dee 2005, 2007; Winters et al., 2013; Gon et al., 2018) and college 
(e.g., Canes and Rosen 1995; Rothstein 1995; Neumark and Gardecki 1996; Bettinger and Long 2005; Hoffmann and 
Oreopoulos 2009; Carrell et al., 2010) is either undetectable or positive, the evidence for elementary school is mixed. 
Most of the studies estimating the effect of female students having female teachers in elementary school find a positive 
effect on test scores (e.g., Winters et al., 2013) with one notable exception (Antecol et al., 2015). Antecol et al. (2015) 
finds that having a female teacher in primary school lowers math test scores of female students in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods. 
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subsidies appear to be largest for these students. Second, we find some evidence that taking 
relatively more AP courses reduces the probability of taking all AP exams. Combined, these results 
suggest that the timing and number of exam subsidies enter the calculus of whether to take an AP 
exam; policymakers and educators can take this into account if they are looking to increase taking 
rates.  
Overall, our results highlight the fact that not all students who take AP courses take the AP 
exam, including some of whom we predict would score a 3 or higher and earn college credit. 
Although we only focus on a few potential ways to induce AP exam taking, we provide evidence 
consistent with a positive effect of exam subsidies on AP exams taking, thereby suggesting that 
students can be incentivized to take AP exams. This may be particularly important given the 
underlying AP exam-taking disparities, especially for Black students with similar academic 
credentials as their White peers. These results build on a rich literature about AP that typically 
focuses on AP course enrollment, spanning inequality in access and enrollment (e.g., Solórzano 
and Ornelas, 2002; Klopfenstein, 2004), impacts on learning (e.g., Conger et al., 2019), and 
impacts on college enrollment (e.g., Jackson, 2010). In an era where school districts (and 
researchers) are fully immersed in advanced coursework, getting students over the last hurdle to 
take an AP exam may be a relatively straightforward policy lever. 
2.2. Data and Setting  
2.2.1. Advanced Placement  
 
Since 1955, Advanced Placement (AP) gives high school students an opportunity to take 
college level courses while in high school and potentially earn college credit. There are currently 
38 different AP courses in seven different subject categories: History and Social Sciences, English, 
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Science, Math and Computer Science, World Language and Culture, Arts, and AP Capstone. Each 
AP course is designed to cover the concepts from the corresponding introductory college level 
course. Schools must be accredited by the AP Course Audit to offer AP courses.  
At the end of an AP course in May, students can take the corresponding AP exam, which 
typically lasts between two to three hours. The exam is designed by college faculty and high school 
teachers to test a mastery of the subject matter at a college level. Exam scores range from 1 to 5 in 
integer values. The exams are only offered once a year, so retaking is rare.  
Most universities provide credit for an AP exam score of 3 or above, but there is 
considerable variation in credit granting across colleges and AP subjects. For example, Appendix 
Table A2.1 shows that credit granting AP exam scores for the ten most popular AP courses in 
Georgia at some of the largest public universities in the state varied between 3 to 5; however, the 
modal score is a 3 and the most academically selective public institution in the state accepts mostly 
4s. In lieu of college credit, some colleges use AP scores for placement in and out of certain 
courses. 
2.2.2. Sample Overview  
 
Our analyses consider four large metro-Atlanta districts from SY 2014-15 to SY 2016-17 
using administrative, student-level data from the Metro Atlanta Policy Lab for Education 
(MAPLE), a collaboration between academic researchers and several Atlanta-area public school 
districts. We refer to these districts as Districts 1, 2, 3, and 4.21  The data include information on 
student and teacher demographics; AP course-taking and course grades; and AP exam taking and 
 
21 We do not reveal the names of the districts for confidentiality reasons. 
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scores. 
To construct the sample, we begin with the high school student-course level data, which 
contains all courses students take in a school year after eighth grade. We restrict the course data to 
only AP courses as identified by course codes from the Georgia Department of Education. We do 
not consider AP Research or AP Seminar courses, classes that were almost never taken across our 
sample (e.g., AP Japanese), or AP Art courses that require a student to submit a portfolio in lieu 
of an exam. 
Most AP courses are two semesters long and most students take both semesters, so we 
primarily make use of the second semester course as a marker for having taken the AP course.22  
For our main sample, we consider only students’ AP courses that are most likely the terminal 
course in a sequence of AP courses (e.g., the first semester of a one-semester sequence or the 
second semester of a two-semester sequence). In particular, we include courses from students who 
took more than one term of a course in a year,23  those who took a course in the final term of the 
year (e.g., in the second semester), and those who took a course in which most students in the 
broad sample take only one semester.24  We view the resulting sample as a good proxy for terminal-
course takers. We run robustness checks with an alternate definition of AP course-taking where 
we consider a student to have taken an AP course if she took any course in a sequence.25  
We determine that a student took the AP exam if an AP exam record exists for the student’s 
 
22 It can also happen that, e.g., an AP subject that is typically two semesters is only offered for one semester. 
23 We also include those enrolled in a year-long term. 
24 These courses are Physics C: Electricity and Magnetism; Government and Politics: Comparative, Economics: 
Microeconomics, and Economics: Macroeconomics. These courses appear to rarely be offered as a two-term 
sequence; in these cases, if a student took only the first term of this sequence, they would be included in the 
main sample. Other courses also appear to in some cases be offered as a one-semester course; if a student took 
one of these one-term courses in a term before the final term (e.g., in the first semester), they would not be 
included in the main sample. 
25 We also include students who did not earn high school course credit in the course. 
61 
 
corresponding course. We do not consider the small set of students who took an AP exam but did 
not take the corresponding course in that same year.26   We also drop the few observations for 
which no student in a district in a year took the corresponding exam (minimum 10 observations).27 
The school data include information on student race and ethnicity. Race is not mutually 
exclusive. Because most students select a mutually exclusive option, we categorize students as 
White, Black, Asian, or other race. The other race category includes those who select multiple 
races as well as American Indian and Pacific Islander. Hispanic/non-Hispanic is its own variable 
indicating if a student self-identifies as having Hispanic origin.28 Additionally, we consider a 
student in a year as being FRL if they are considered eligible for either free or reduced-price lunch. 
We make use of two primary samples with the above data. The first sample is at the student-
year-course level (which we refer to as student-course hereafter) and includes 194,778 
observations. This sample allows for multiple observations per student when they take multiple 
AP courses. The second sample is at the student-year level and includes 95,074 observations. It 
has only one observation per student per year to examine student decisions at the aggregate level. 
This sample includes only observations in which all of a students’ courses are what we consider 
to be terminal courses in the year.  
The Appendix contains additional details on the data preparation, such as how we clean 
the raw data and how we treat students who transfer districts but have conflicting demographic 
 
26 This can happen for a number of reasons such as if the student took a similar course that was not AP and wanted to 
try their luck on the AP exam or if the student has accumulated exam-specific knowledge in another way such as by 
learning a language outside of school. 
27 In particular, we drop (observations in a district-year) twice for Physics 1 and once for Physics 2 (all the same 
district), and twice for Government & Politics: Comparative (both for the same district). These represent 
approximately 1 percent of observations. In some cases, 0 students took the exam in a school in a district, potentially 
due to missing data; we keep these observations as long as there was at least one who took it in the district. 
28 In the summary statistics, we group and define underrepresented minorities (URM) by combining students 
who are at least one of Hispanic, American Indian, Black, and Pacific Islander. 
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information. All these decisions are about small subsets of students and will not impact our results. 
2.2.3. Summary Statistics  
 
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics of high school students in general (column 1) and 
AP course takers (column 2). The unit of observation is the student, regardless of how many AP 
exams they took. The first two columns show that there are disproportionately lower percentages 
of FRL, Black, and Hispanic students taking AP courses compared to their shares in the student 
body. The first column of Table 2.1 shows that around half of the high school students in our four 
metro-Atlanta districts are FRL eligible, are female, or are Black. Column 2 shows that students 
who enroll in an AP course are less likely to be FRL eligible, Black, or Hispanic (33 percent are 
FRL eligible, 33 percent are Black, and 13 percent are Hispanic) than the entire student body (50 
percent are FRL eligible, 49 percent are Black, and 18 percent are Hispanic). Most of the AP 
students are from grades 11 and 12 (32 and 27 percent, respectively). In addition, most of the AP 
students are from districts 3 and 4 (62 percent) rather than 1 and 2 (38 percent).  
The remaining columns of Table 2.1 are at the student-course level such that there can be 
multiple observations per student. It shows all AP course enrollments (column 3), AP course 
enrollments that do not lead to an exam (column 4), and AP course enrollments that do lead to an 
exam (column 5). The third column shows that 30 percent of all AP courses are taken by FRL 
students, 54 percent by female students, and 28 percent by Black students. 
Similarly, there are stark differences between the statistics in the fourth and fifth columns, 
which highlight the differences between AP course enrollees who take an AP exam and those who 
do not. Specifically, the fourth column shows that 34 percent of the AP courses that do not lead to 
an exam are taken by FRL students, 54 percent by female students, and 41 percent by Black 
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students. The fifth column shows that 29 percent of the AP courses that lead to an exam are taken 
by FRL students, 55 percent by female students, and 25 percent by Black students. Twelfth graders 
take the highest share of total AP courses (41 percent) and the highest share of courses that do not 
lead to an AP exam (59 percent). Importantly, the average numeric grade in AP courses is higher 
for exam takers compared to non-exam takers. The average numeric grade for all AP course takers 
is 91.97, exam non takers is 86.11, and exam takers is 93.04. This is the first indication of positive 
selection into AP exam taking.  
AP exam-taking behavior also varies by AP course. Table 2.2 presents the number of AP 
course enrollments, the percent of AP courses leading to AP exam, predicted percent of AP courses 
leading to AP exam (adjusted for academic performance and student demographics), average AP 
exam score for exam takers, and percent of females enrolled in AP courses for different AP 
courses. The AP courses are grouped by the broad subjects and sorted by the number of course 
takers within each category. From column 1 we see that some of the most popular AP courses in 
our sample are World History and US History and they have a high unconditional probability of 
leading to an AP exam (92 percent and 89 percent, respectively, compared to 85 percent in the full 
sample). Some of the least popular courses are foreign languages such as Chinese, Spanish and 
German.  
From column 2, we find that the highest unconditional probability of taking an exam is for 
Calculus BC and Chinese (94.3 percent and 93.4 percent, respectively). Column 3 shows the 
probability of taking an exam conditional on academic performance and students demographic is 
highest for Calculus BC and Spanish Language (92.3 percent and 90.7 percent, respectively). From 
column 4, we see that some of the highest average AP exam scores are in Spanish Language and 
Calculus BC (3.8 and 3.7, respectively), which can explain their higher exam-taking rates. Column 
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5 shows that some of the highest percentages of female student enrollments are in French and 
Spanish Literature (68.0 percent and 67.3 percent female, respectively) while some of the lowest 
female participation is in Computer Science A and Physics C - Electricity & Magnetism (22 
percent and 22.3 percent female, respectively). 
2.2.4. AP Exam Prices and Subsidies 
 
The full price of each AP exam is approximately $90 but varies by year. “Low-income” 
students pay considerably less but it varies by school district. The College Board pays about $30 
of all AP exams for low-income students and the state of Georgia pays the remaining balance of 
one AP exam for all low-income public school students.29  The College Board defines “low-
income” as a family with income below 185 percent of the national poverty level or qualified as 
an “identified student.”30 In practice, school counselors and school administrators help find and 
validate subsidy eligible students.  
School districts also offer varying subsidies for AP exams. During the sample period, two 
sample districts offered unlimited free AP exams for all students.31  In contrast, the policies of the 
two other districts varied by the FRL status of the student: one offered two free AP exams for FRL 
eligible students and one for non-FRL students and another offered unlimited free AP exams for 
FRL-eligible students and one free AP exam for non-FRL-eligible students.32    
 
29 Details as of 2020 found here: https://apcentral.collegeboard.org/ap-coordinators/exam-ordering-
fees/exam-fees/federal-state-assistance 
30 Students at a Community Eligibility Provision participant schools do not automatically qualify but need further 
validation such as being an “identified student.” An identified student is defined by College Board as a student in 
foster care, in Head Start, experiencing homelessness or migrancy, or living in households that receive SNAP/Food 
Stamps, TANF cash assistance, or who receives the Food Distribution on Indian Reservations benefits. See details 
here: https://apcentral.collegeboard.org/ap-coordinators/exam-ordering-fees/exam-fees/reductions 
31 One of these districts requires all students to pay a $10 fee. 
32 See Appendix Table A2.3 for details. 
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2.3. Methodology 
2.3.1. Predicting AP Exam Scores 
 
We start by predicting AP exam scores for students who do not take the exams and hence 
have no score. As noted, we find that many AP courses do not lead to AP exams, yet this fact alone 
is not necessarily concerning. If a student is unlikely to perform well on the AP exam and will 
likely not earn college credit, then nothing is lost and, arguably, something is gained (e.g., time) 
by not taking the exam. However, if they are likely to score well on the exam but do not take it, 
they may be “leaving college credit on the table.”  
To predict AP exam scores, we use the student-course level sample and regress the AP 
exam scores of AP exam takers on a number of predictor variables, as seen below: 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛼1 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝜆𝑔 +  𝜂𝑠𝑐 +  𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑔𝑡   (1)  
 
where individual i in school s took AP course c in grade level g in year t. Each student may appear 
in multiple observations if they take multiple AP courses. Score is the integer score obtained on 
the AP exam. We include a vector of observed covariates X which includes indicators for gender, 
race/ethnicity, FRL status, and course grade. We also include a set of fixed effects, including 
school-by-course fixed effects (𝜂𝑠𝑐) – because there are different propensities to take the exam 
across different courses (see Table 2.2) and across schools—as well as year (𝜏𝑡) and grade level 
(𝜆𝑔) fixed effects. 
We obtain coefficient estimates from equation (1) using Ordinary Least Squares and apply 
them to all observations to obtain predicted AP exam scores. These predictions are not integers 
because of our linear probability model but the continuous score can be thought of as a weighted 
probability of two integer scores. We also test the robustness of the result by estimating a logit 
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model where the outcome is whether the student scores a 3 or above. This allows us to sum the 
predicted probabilities and determine how many students would get a 3 or higher. We obtain 
similar results, so we only present the above equation and results.  
 Regardless of our estimation strategy, our predictions are based only on observable student 
characteristics. It is likely that students do not take AP exams because they believe they would 
perform poorly for reasons unobserved to the researchers. For example, “bad exam takers” may 
choose not to take the exam and this could be correlated with some of our observable 
characteristics. We believe that this scenario and most other scenarios are likely to bias our 
predicted scores of non-takers upward and thereby inflate the fraction of non-exam takers who 
would receive a 3 or higher.  As such, our estimates should be considered an upper bound.   
2.3.2. Determinants of AP Exam Taking 
 
We estimate predictors and correlates of AP exam taking among all the AP courses by 
using variations of the following equation: 
𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑔𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑅𝐿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠𝑔 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑔𝑡   (2) 
 
This equation is similar to equation (1) and preserves its notation, but the outcome variable is now 
an indicator for whether the student took the exam corresponding to the course.33 The sample now 
includes all courses, not only the courses that resulted in an exam. We estimate several variations 
of this equation, but in our preferred specification, X includes gender and race/ethnicity indicators, 
and linear course grade. In all the variations of this model we include year (𝜏𝑡) and course (𝜃𝑐) 
 
33 The main differences are that in equation 1, to improve predictive power, we include bins of course grade 
and school-by-subject fixed effects, while in equation 2, we include a linear course grade, course subject fixed 
effects, and up to school-grade level (ninth, tenth, etc.) fixed effects.   
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fixed effects and the preferred model includes school-by-grade (𝛿𝑠𝑔) fixed effect as well. We vary 
the sets of fixed effects to include different combinations of district, grade level, district-by-grade 
level, and school fixed effects to test the stability of our estimates on the other coefficients. We 
cluster the standard errors at the school level. We are particularly interested in 𝛽2, which represents 
the percentage point difference in the probability of taking an AP exam, conditional on enrolling 
in the course, between FRL students and non-FRL students. 
In addition to the student-course level analyses above, we also define the unit of 
observation to be at the student-year level in the following equation: 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛾1 +  𝛾2𝐹𝑅𝐿𝑖 +  𝛾3𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠𝑔 + 𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡   (3) 
 
Here, NumExam is a count variable denoting how many AP exams a student took. NCourse is a 
count variable for the number of AP courses the student took. We use this model to analyze how  
FRL status, race, ethnicity, gender, and the number of courses relate to the number of AP exams 
taken, conditional on the number of AP courses. The other variables are as previously defined; 
course grade is now the average grade of each of the courses. The coefficients of primary interest 
are 𝛾2 and 𝛾3, which show the difference in the number of exams taken by FRL students and the 
conversion rate to exam for each additional course, respectively.  
In one specification that relies on equation (3), we analyze AP exam subsidy policies by 
making use of the number of exams a student can take for free. We determine this based on the 
student’s FRL status and district. In districts 1 and 2, the number of free exams is equal to the 
number of courses. For one district among districts 3 and 4, the number of free exams is one for 
non-FRL students and two for FRL students (who take at least two courses). For the other district, 
it is one for non-FRL students, and is equal to the number of courses for FRL students. 
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We also consider an alternative dependent variable in equation (3), an indicator of whether 
the student took the same number of exams as courses (AllExam). The intent of this analysis is to 
assess whether taking relatively more courses reduces the probability of taking all exams. Students 
may be short on time or money and have to choose from their set of AP courses. In fact, Pope and 
Fillmore (2015) find that the timing and order of AP exams impacts performance.    
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Basic Statistics  
 
Overall, 15 percent of the AP courses do not lead to an AP exam (Figure 2.1). We also find 
substantial disparities between traditionally disadvantaged populations and relatively-advantaged 
students. For example, 18 percent of the courses taken by FRL students do not lead to an exam but 
the statistic is 15 percent for non-FRL students. For Black students, 23 percent of courses do not 
lead to exams while for White and Asian students it is 13 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
Eighteen percent of the courses taken by Hispanic students do not lead to an exam compared to 15 
percent for non-Hispanic students. 
We also see differential exam-taking rates by grade and district. Twenty-three percent of 
twelfth graders’ AP courses do not lead to an AP exam, while lower grades are close to 10 percent. 
Students from districts 3 and 4 are more likely to be enrolled in an AP course that do not lead to 
exams (18 percent) compared to those from districts 1 and 2 (10 percent). 
Table 2.3 explores the relationship between the number of AP courses taken by a student 
in a year and the number of AP exams taken. More than half of students take only one course in a 
year (column 5), and few take more than five. The second column shows that the percentage of 
students who take zero AP exams decreases monotonically (but not linearly) from 16.6 percent to 
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2 percent as the number of AP courses increases from one to five. As the number of AP courses 
increase from one to five, the percentage of students taking all the AP exams in the courses enrolled 
in decreases from 83.4 percent to 66.2 percent (third column): the more AP courses, the lower the 
probability of taking all the corresponding AP exams. Also, the mean number of exams taken 
increases monotonically as the number of AP courses increases (fourth column). 
Combined, Table 2.3 shows the intuitive result that students who take more AP courses 
take more AP exams. However, it also shows that students taking more AP courses are less likely 
to take all exams. This is despite the fact that we may expect the students taking more courses to 
be positively selected. These unconditional statistics motivate later analyses on how the number 
of courses relates to the number of exams, controlling for student characteristics. 
2.4.2. Predicting AP Exam Scores 
 
On average, we find that students predicted to earn higher AP grades do earn higher grades 
in reality, albeit with a fair amount of dispersion. Figure 2.2 presents box and whisker plots of 
predicted AP exam scores for each actual AP exam score, with the sample limited to courses that 
resulted in AP exams. The box represents the interquartile range, or the 25th through 75th 
percentiles, with the median in the middle. The whiskers are the top (bottom) percentile plus 
(minus) 1.5 times the interquartile range. We obtain a relatively high correlation coefficient 
between predicted and actual score of 0.78 and an R-squared of 0.61 from the prediction equation. 
The prediction performs relatively poorly in the tails but, fortunately, students predicted to score 
at the tails are less likely to be misclassified as scoring above/below a 3, which is the point of the 
exercise.     
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AP exam non-takers are predicted to perform less well than AP exam takers. Figure 2.3 
plots the kernel density of predicted AP exam scores for AP exam takers and non-takers. AP exam 
takers have a higher predicted score (solid line) than AP exam non takers (dashed line). This is an 
expected result since it may not make sense to take an exam if likely to not perform well. However, 
this analysis is based entirely on observable characteristics, so it is possible that the true densities 
are further apart, depending on the role of unobservables in the decision to not take an exam.  
Table 2.4 catalogues the results of the prediction exercise and leads us to the result that up 
to 32 percent of non-exam takers could score a 3 or higher. We group the continuous predicted 
scores into the discrete bands of length 0.5,indicated in the first column. The second column is the 
count of AP courses that did not lead to exams in a given band, and the third columns shows the 
corresponding percent. Summing the third column for predicted AP grades of 2.5 and above, we 
find that 32 percent of the courses that do not lead to an AP exam would receive a 3 or higher, a 
score than generally corresponds to college credit. This totals 9,495 AP courses in the four school 
districts in three years. The more conservative approach, which is to include only students 
predicted to receive a 3 or higher without rounding, yields a substantially smaller estimate of 16 
percent.34  The fourth column is the total number of students with predicted (not actual) AP exam 
scores, regardless of whether they took the exam or not. The fifth column is the ratio of the second 
and fourth columns and represents the share of courses that had no exam among all courses in each 
predicted grade band. The decreasing nature of this ratio is consistent with students choosing not 
to take the exam based on their probability of not scoring well. Yet, there are still a substantial 
number of students at high scores who do not take the exams and potentially leave college credit 
on the table. 
 
34 The logit model described in section 2.3.1 corresponds to the conservative model. 
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2.4.3. Determinants of AP Exam-taking 
 
Table 2.5 explores the determinants of AP exam taking to investigate whether disparities 
by subgroup exist (after controlling for other factors) and whether any potential policies to increase 
AP exam taking and alleviate disparities present themselves. We estimate equation (2) with only 
course and year fixed effects and find that FRL-eligible students are 3.6 percentage points less 
likely to take an AP exam after taking the AP course. This negative relationship is common 
between measures of income and educational outcomes but in this context, it was not a foregone 
conclusion given that the FRL students were already enrolled in the course.    
FRL status is likely correlated with race/ethnicity and other variables, so we add in a set of 
controls to test the stability of our initial FRL coefficient. Column 2 adds controls for sex and 
race/ethnicity in addition to the course and year fixed effects in column 1. The coefficient on FRL 
status is now statistically indistinguishable from zero but the coefficients on race and ethnicity 
highlight some disparities. Black and Hispanic students are 11 and 4.3 percentage points less likely 
to take an AP exam than White and non-Hispanic students, respectively.   
We next provide evidence that students with lower AP course numeric grades are less likely 
to take the AP exam. Figure 2.4 shows the positive relationship between numeric AP course grade 
and the probability of taking the AP exam. Not only does this reinforce the previous analyses that 
some students with a low probability of performing well (as measured by course grades) are not 
taking the exam but it also suggests that AP course grade is an important determinant that could 
be confounded with our demographic variables; thus, it is an important control variable. Another 
notable insight from Figure 2.4 is that there are more circles above the diamonds when the numeric 
score is lower than 70. This shows that FRL eligible students are more likely to take the AP exam 
even for lower AP course grades.  
72 
 
Adding course grade to the regressions, as in column 3 of Table 2.5, confirms the positive 
relationship between course grades and AP exam taking, even conditional on other student 
characteristics. Interestingly, the coefficient on FRL status is now a positive 2.1 percentage points, 
showing that FRL students with similar course performances as non-FRL students are more likely 
to take the AP exam. This motivates analyses below as to whether the subsidies that target FRL 
students are playing a role. The coefficients on race and ethnicity are somewhat muted relative to 
the previous column but the disparities remain. 
We add various combinations of district, school, and grade-level fixed effects in columns 
4 through 7 of Table 2.5, and the coefficients are relatively insensitive to our choice of fixed 
effects.35   Column 7 is our preferred specification because the school-by-grade fixed effects mean 
we are comparing students with different characteristics (e.g., race or FRL status) but who are in 
the same high school and grade, which could conceivably explain the coefficients (but does not in 
practice). We find that FRL eligible students have a 2 percentage point higher probability of taking 
the AP exam than non-FRL students. Given the baseline prevalence of taking an AP exam is 85 
percent, this amounts to a 2.35 percent increase in the probability of taking the AP exam. This is 
not an especially large coefficient or implied percent; however, the fact that FRL students tend to 
lag behind in most educational outcomes makes this coefficient stand out relative to the existing 
literature. Also, this positive relationship between FRL status and exam taking is consistent with 
higher AP exam subsidies for FRL students than for non-FRL students in two of our four partner 
school districts. We explore this further in section 2.4.4.   
 
35 We obtain nearly identical results for the model with school fixed effects when we instead use school random 
effects. 
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 In column 7, we see small differences in AP exam-taking rates by gender (females are 0.8 
percentage points lower than males), but Black students are 3.8 percentage points less likely to 
take an AP exam than their White peers (in the same school and grade). While we cannot explain 
this result, it is worthy of future investigation. Finally, other race students have a 1.8 percentage 
point lower probability of taking an exam compared to their White peers, and Hispanic students 
have a 1.3 percentage point lower probability of taking an AP exam compared to their non- 
Hispanic peers.36    
2.4.4. AP Subsidies 
 
To explore if the positive relationship between FRL eligibility and AP exam taking (found 
in column 7 of Table 2.5) might be driven by the two school districts that provide higher AP exam 
subsidies for FRL students than for non-FRL students, we perform subsample analysis in Table 
2.6. Panel A includes only districts 1 and 2—those that offer all AP exams for free to all students, 
regardless of their FRL status. In column 1, we obtain a large, negative, and significant coefficient 
on the FRL variable. However, as we add controls, especially fixed effects, we find no statistical 
relationship with FRL status and AP exam taking in these districts. This null effect is largely a 
desirable result for districts because FRL students tend to lag behind in educational outcomes. 
Panel B of Table 2.6 only includes districts 3 and 4, the districts in which FRL students get 
more AP exam subsidies than non-FRL students. With a full set of controls, we show that being 
FRL eligible is associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in the probability of taking the AP 
exam compared to non-FRL students. Taken together, Panels A and B of Table 2.6 show that the 
 
36 We do a robustness check for these results in table with an alternate definition of AP course taking. In Appendix 
Table A2.3, we define a student to have taken an AP course if she took any course in that AP course sequence in that 
year. The results are qualitatively the same. 
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results in Table 2.5 are driven by districts 3 and 4—the very districts that provide extra financial 
incentives for FRL students to take the AP exams.    
We next look deeper into the impact of AP exam subsidies by analyzing the data at the 
student level and looking across districts and FRL status. Table 2.7 shows the results of equation 
3 where the outcome is the number of AP exams taken. Similar to Table 2.5, we see that the 
coefficient on FRL is positive and statistically significant, implying that conditional on a host of 
variables, particularly numeric grade, FRL students take 0.025 more AP exams than non-FRL 
students. The coefficient is relatively small in magnitude but surprisingly non-negative. 
We then explore the relationships of various demographic and academic variables with the 
number of AP exams taken by a student for different subsamples. To that end, we restrict the 
sample to various district and FRL status combinations in columns 2 through 7. We first consider 
districts 1 and 2, where the amount of the AP exam subsidy does not depend on FRL status and all 
students get all exams for free. In column 2, we cannot detect a relationship between FRL status 
and the number of AP exams taken. Column 5 restricts to districts 3 and 4, where the AP exam 
subsidy varies by FRL status. In contrast to the result for districts 1 and 2, we find that FRL 
students take 0.040 more AP exams compared to non-FRL students, which is consistent with the 
exam subsidy influencing exam taking. Further evidence in support of the positive role of subsidies 
is shown by comparing the coefficients on the number of courses in columns 2 and 5. We find that 
taking one more AP course results in 0.939 more AP exams in the districts that provide all exams 
for free (districts 1 and 2), while in the districts that do not, taking one more AP course results in 
0.880 more AP exams.  
Next, we next split column 2 (districts 1 and 2) into FRL students (column 3) and non-FRL 
students (column 4) to further examine the role of subsidies by FRL status. Non-FRL students 
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have a higher conversion rate of course to exam (one more course leads to 0.945 more AP exams) 
compared to FRL students (one more course leads to 0.899 more AP exams). Absent higher 
subsidies compared to non-FRL students, FRL students in districts 1 and 2 are less likely to take 
an AP exam, which is consistent with most literature and the negative relationship between FRL 
status and educational outcomes. However, we find the opposite in districts 3 and 4 in which FRL 
students take more exams than non-FRL students. Specifically, taking one more course leads to 
0.920 more exams for FRL students, while this number is 0.854 for non-FRL students. These 
results are consistent with a “subsidy effect” that drives the course to exam conversion rate up, 
even more so than any “FRL effect,” which tends to drive the course to exam conversion rate 
down.  
Column 8 adds the number of subsidized exams to the previous analysis to estimate the 
relationship between the number of subsidized AP exams and the number of AP exams taken. This 
number depends on the district a student is in, her/his FRL status, and the number of courses to 
which s/he is enrolled. We find that after controlling for FRL status and the number of AP courses 
enrolled in, one more subsidized exam leads to 0.075 more AP exams. Again, these findings are 
consistent with subsidies positively affecting AP exam taking.37  
We also test for non-linearities in the number of AP courses but results, shown in Appendix 
Table A2.5, are qualitatively similar to our linear specification. 
2.4.5. Gender and Role Models 
 
 
37 We do a robustness check for the results in Appendix Table A2.4 with an alternate definition of AP course taking. 
We define a student to have taken an AP course if she took any course in that AP course sequence in that year. The 
results are qualitatively the same.  
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Next, we follow the literature on gender matching of student and instructors serving to 
improve educational outcomes. Specifically, we explore whether female students take fewer AP 
exams than male students in AP courses that are underrepresented by females and whether female 
instructors have the potential to influence female students’ exam-taking rates. We start by splitting 
the AP subjects into those that are underrepresented and overrepresented by females across our 
four school districts: subjects where less than 40 percent of the students are female, subjects where 
40-60 percent of the students are female, and subjects where more than 60 percent of the students 
are female.38 Females are underrepresented in subjects like computer science and physics but 
overrepresented in subjects like psychology and English.   
We have two predictions about female student exam-taking rates based on previous 
literature regarding gender differences in education and subject and career tracts (e.g., Buser et al., 
2014). First, female students are less likely to take AP exams in subjects where they are 
underrepresented. Second, female students with female instructors are more likely to take an AP 
exam than their male counterparts in subjects where females are underrepresented.  
Neither of our predictions are confirmed by the analysis. Table 2.8 shows the regression 
results where the unit of observation is again a student-course (equation 2) and the outcome is 
whether an exam is taken, but now we include teacher gender and the interaction with student 
gender.39 In the full sample (column 1), we estimate a small and negative relationship between 
student gender and exam taking (-1.1 percentage point). However, the estimates between subjects 
that are underrepresented by females (column 2) and those well represented by females (column 
3) are not meaningfully different from one another. We also find no statistical relationship of the 
 
38 See Table 2.2 for percentage female by subject. 
39 The few observations with missing teacher gender are excluded from these analyses. 
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interaction of female teacher with female students on exam taking, even in underrepresented 
subjects (column 2). Overall, we find no evidence that matching female students with female 
instructors has any influence on the probability of taking an AP exam.  
We note that these estimates are not based on random assignment of students and teachers, 
so our estimates are likely biased. The coefficient on female is likely biased upward if female 
students in underrepresented subjects are substantially different than the typical female student (on 
observables and unobservables). Similarly, if female students sort into classrooms with female 
instructors, they may be positively selected and bias our estimates upward. But in this case, an 
upward bias has some meaning because we found no statistical relationship between AP exam 
taking and females being paired with female teachers. An upward bias implies that the unbiased 
estimate is bounded by zero, which is a rejection of the “role model effect” of female teachers on 
female students on AP exam taking in underrepresented subjects.  
2.4.6. Twelfth Graders 
 
High school twelfth graders face different incentives to take an AP exam than students in 
lower grades. First, twelfth graders may know with more certainty if and where they will go to 
college and the college credit offered (or not) for an AP exam score. Second, time in high school 
is ending, so students only have one more opportunity to earn college credit while in high school. 
Our data shows that twelfth graders are both the most common AP course and exam takers but 
they also have the highest prevalence of not taking an exam after taking the course (23 percent 
compared to 10, 8, and 12 percent for grades 9, 10 and 11, respectively).  
To further explore the relationship between high school grade of the student on AP exam 
taking, we split the sample into twelfth graders and those in other grades and re-estimate equation 
78 
 
3 (analogous to Table 2.7). In panel A of Table 2.9 we see how FRL eligibility, number of courses 
enrolled in, and number of subsidized tests relate to the number of AP exams for non-twelfth 
graders. In panel B we see the same relationships for twelfth graders.  
Comparing the coefficients for FRL indicator in the two panels of Table 2.9 reveals that 
the earlier results of Table 2.7 were driven by twelfth graders. That is, being an FRL student in 
twelfth grade is associated with taking more AP exams and this is driven by districts 3 and 4 where 
exam subsidies are higher for FRL students than for non-FRL students. If students are not to 
receive credit at the college they plan to attend, then there is little incentive to take the AP exams, 
even with a subsidy.  
Next, evaluating the coefficients on the number of courses by panel reveals that in districts 
1 and 2, each additional course enrollment leads to a higher number of additional exams compared 
to districts 3 and 4 (compare column 2 and 5). However, the difference is much larger for twelfth 
graders compared to non-twelfth graders. So, the higher subsidy generosity is related to more exam 
taking for twelfth graders more so than to non-twelfth graders. Comparing columns 3 and 4 in the 
two panels we see that in districts that have the same subsidy policy for all students (districts 1 and 
2), the non-FRL students have a higher “conversion rate” from course to exam compared to the 
FRL students for both twelfth graders and non-twelfth graders. However, this relationship is more 
pronounced for twelfth graders (0.854 for FRL students versus 0.920 for non-FRL students) 
compared to non-twelfth graders (0.961 for FRL students versus 0.976 for non-FRL students). 
Also, comparing columns 6 and 7 in the two panels we see that for the districts where the AP exam 
subsidy generosity depends on FRL status (districts 3 and 4), FRL eligible students have a higher 
conversion rate from course to exam for each additional course compared to non FRL students. 
Again, this relationship is more pronounced for twelfth graders (0.866 for FRL students versus 
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0.783 for non-FRL students) compared to non-twelfth graders (0.964 for FRL students versus 
0.916 for non-FRL students). Taken together, this means that while AP subsidy is positively 
associated with AP exam taking for the full sample, the association is primarily driven by twelfth 
graders. It also leaves open the question as to why exam subsidies are seemingly less effective in 
earlier graders.  
2.4.7. Number of Courses 
 
In this section, we further investigate how taking different numbers of courses relates to 
the probability of taking all the AP exams corresponding to those courses. As discussed previously, 
the number of courses in which a student enrolls is related to the number of AP exams. We also 
learned that the probability of taking all exams monotonically decreases with the number of 
courses in which a student enrolls (Table 2.3). This analysis uses a variation of equation 3 but the 
dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the student took all the AP exams 
corresponding to the set of courses in which the student enrolled.  
The first column of Table 2.10 shows that FRL students have a 1.3 percentage point higher 
probability of taking all the exams among her/his courses compared to non-FRL students. From 
columns 2 and 3, we see that the full sample results are driven by districts 3 and 4 where the AP 
subsidy generosity is based on FRL status. This is consistent with what we see in Table 2.7 and 
shows that an AP subsidy is associated with a higher probability of taking all the exams. 
Furthermore, from column 1 we see that being Black or other race is associated with 3.4 and 2.3 
percentage point lower probability of taking all the AP exams compared to being White. From 
columns 2 and 3 we see that these race specific results are also driven by districts 3 and 4, the 
districts that have higher AP subsidies for FRL students compared to non-FRL students.  
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We also see that the probability of taking all the exams monotonically decreases with the 
number of courses even conditional on a rich set of controls. From columns 2 and 3, we see a 
similar pattern for both groups of districts. However, a negative and statistically significant 
association of taking all the exams with additional courses show up from the fourth course onward 
for districts 1 and 2, whereas a more pronounced negative significant association shows up from 
second course onwards in districts 3 and 4.40   
These results speak to district exam subsidy policy and AP course enrollment policy. 
Students will not take all AP exams as they take more courses. The results also show that some 
districts (1 and 2) do not see this until students take relatively many AP courses. But this last fact 
is only true for the districts that provide all AP exams are free for all students. On the other hand, 
the districts that do not do so (districts 3 and 4) show a much higher level of non-exam taking at 
higher number of AP course loads. 
2.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We find that the practice of AP course-taking without exam taking is fairly prevalent in the 
four metro-Atlanta school districts that comprise our sample, with 15 percent of the AP courses 
not leading to an exam. We estimate that up to 32 percent of the courses that do not lead to an AP 
exam would receive a score of 3 or higher if the exam was taken. Thus, high school students seem 
to be leaving credit on the table by not taking the AP exams.  
In our sample of four school districts over three years, this amounts to an upper bound of 
9,495 AP courses that could have turned to college credits if the AP exams were taken. In SY 
 
40 In Table 2.9, we split the sample by ninth-eleventh grade and twelfth grade. We find that the FRL results are 
driven by twelfth graders. We also find roughly similar results for additional courses, with larger magnitudes 
for twelfth graders. 
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2017-18, the tuition and fees faced by a four-year in-state Georgia public college student was 
$7,206.41  Assuming a typical college student enrolls for 30 credits per year (10 three credit 
courses), one three credit college course costs $721. 9,495 successful AP exams would save 
students in the four districts up to $6.8 million over three years.42 This is roughly eight times the 
cost of these AP exams ($0.9 million)43 for the students or the state and school districts,44 though 
it is a smaller multiple if unsuccessful exams are factored in.  
AP course offerings and exam subsidies are well within the control of school districts, 
though budgets constrain the ability to pay for these courses and subsidies. In exploring the 
possible determinants of AP exam taking, we show strong evidence that districts’ policies on exam 
subsidies seem to improve exam-taking rates. The existing policies make it no less likely that FRL 
students take exams than non-FRL students in the same high school with the same course grades. 
We also show some evidence that the timing and number of AP courses relates to the probability 
of taking exams, which can inform which students are at risk of not taking the exam.  
We also show no statistical relationship between females having female versus male 
instructors in classes where females are underrepresented. This does not leave us with a direct 
policy lever relating to gender, but it does add to the growing literature on “instructors like me.” 
Unlike most research in the area, our null effect highlights that not all contexts yield positive 
results.  
Our results quantify the potential issue of not taking AP exams and highlight that this may 
be a relatively straightforward policy lever for schools and districts, especially because students 
 
41 Source: National Center for Education Statistics, 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_330.20.asp. Table 330.20. 
42 $721*9,495 = $6,845,895. 
43 $91*9,495 = $864,045. This assumes the previous cost of $91, which is now $94.  
44 The calculation depends on whether the student, district, state, or College Board pays the fees. 
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are already taking the AP course. However, we cannot and do not quantify the benefits and costs 
of AP course enrollment, which is front and center of many administrators’ minds. The benefits 
(and costs) of the course enrollment may far outweigh the benefits (and costs) of taking the exam.  
Our work also only examines policies and practices that are observable in the data. Schools 
and districts likely push students to take AP exams in ways unobserved to the researchers. Policies, 
initiatives, and intervention around AP exam taking are a fruitful area for future research. 
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2.6. Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 2.1: Percent of AP Courses Without a Corresponding AP Exam 
 
Note: This figure shows the percent of AP courses that do not lead to an AP exam in the full sample and in 
subsamples by race, ethnicity and FRL status. 
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Figure 2.2: Actual and Predicted AP Exam Grade of AP Exam-Takers 
 
Notes: This figure shows a box and whisker plot of predicted AP exam score vs. actual AP exam score for AP exam-
takers (where the unit observation is a student-year-course). The middle of the box is the median, and the edges are 
the interquartile range, or the 25th and 75th percentiles. The top line, or whisker, is the adjacent value, which is the 
75th percentile plus the interquartile range multiplied by 1.5. The bottom line, or whisker, is the 25th percentile 
minus the interquartile range multiplied by 1.5 Observations beyond the whiskers, or outside values, are not 
displayed. 
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Figure 2.3: Predicted AP Exam Grade Distribution for Exam Takers and Non-Takers 
 
Notes: This figure shows kernel densities of predicted AP exam grade for AP exam-takers (where the unit 
observation is a student-year-course) in blue and for non-AP Exam-takers in red. 
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Figure 2.4: Relationship Between Course Grade and Exam-Taking 
 
Notes: This figure shows the relation between course grade (x-axis) and the percentage of student with a given 
course grade of at least 40 who take the corresponding AP exam (y-axis). Calculations are performed at the student-
course-year level. 
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Figure 2.5: Relationship between Exam Score and Course Grade 
 
Notes: This figure shows the relation between course grade (x-axis) and the average AP exam score (y-axis) for the 
corresponding AP exam for students with a given course grade of at least 40. Calculations are performed at the student-
course-year level, and are conditional on the student taking the exam. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
 Student-level Course-level 
 Full Sample AP Course-taking Students All No Exam Exam 
FRL 0.50 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.29 
Female 0.49 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.55 
Black 0.49 0.33 0.28 0.41 0.25 
Asian 0.09 0.17 0.22 0.14 0.23 
White 0.31 0.41 0.42 0.35 0.44 
Other 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 
Hispanic 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.12 
Grade 9 0.29 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.09 
Grade 10 0.26 0.25 0.17 0.09 0.18 
Grade 11 0.22 0.32 0.34 0.26 0.36 
Grade 12 0.23 0.27 0.41 0.59 0.37 
District 1 and 2 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.23 0.37 
District 3 and 4 0.65 0.62 0.65 0.77 0.63 
Numeric Grade  90.54 91.97 86.11 93.04 
Observations 387,698 95,074 194,778 30,125 164,653 
Notes: This table shows means for several populations: 1. Full Sample, which includes all students—regardless of if they took an AP exam—in grades 9-12; this 
column is at the student-year level. 2. The AP course-taking sample, which is at the student-year level. 3. The AP course-taking sample, which is at the student-
year-course level. The final two columns split column 3 by whether or not the course led to an exam. 
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Table 2.2: AP Course Subjects 
Course N % Took 
Exam 
Predicted % 
Took Exam 
Exam 
Grade 
Female 
History and Social Sciences 
    
   World History 20,209 92.0 86.2 2.7 56.2 
   US History 19,594 89.4 88.3 2.6 55.5 
   Economics: Macroeconomics 14,528 73.9 78.4 2.8 50.6 
   Psychology 12,438 85.9 87.7 3.1 63.3 
   Human Geography 12,184 90.6 86.5 2.7 55.3 
   Government & Politics: US 9,019 83.0 81.8 2.6 53.1 
   Economics: Microeconomics 4,343 76.0 80 3.2 44.0 
   European History 1,105 82.7 81.6 3.3 47.6 
   Government & Politics: Comparative 1,046 82.5 81.8 3.4 49.4 
English 
     
   English Language & Composition 17,635 91.1 90.1 2.8 62.6 
   English Literature & Composition 12,390 75.5 81.5 2.6 63.6 
Sciences 
     
   Environmental Science 10,572 75.5 77.2 2.6 54.3 
   Biology 8,572 88.2 87.5 2.8 58.2 
   Physics 1 7,597 80.9 79.1 2.3 45.7 
   Chemistry 4,828 87.7 85.9 2.8 51.6 
   Physics C – Mechanics 1,097 83.9 85.2 3.9 30.9 
   Physics C - Electricity & Magnetism 993 86.2 86.7 3.6 22.3 
   Physics 2 633 56.4 55.7 2.6 39.0 
Math and Computer Science 
    
   Calculus AB 9,771 85.0 87.6 2.8 52.4 
   Statistics 9,717 79.5 82.5 2.7 52.5 
   Calculus BC 4,513 94.3 92.3 3.7 44.3 
   Computer Science A 3,624 71.1 69.6 2.8 22.0 
   Computer Science Principles 1,053 78.1 76.3 3.2 24.2 
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World Languages and Cultures 
    
   Spanish Language 3,365 88.9 90.7 3.8 63.2 
   French  1,067 85.4 88.5 3.1 68.0 
   Latin 429 88.1 87.9 2.6 49.0 
   German  338 88.5 87.5 3.6 50.9 
   Spanish Literature 278 83.8 86.5 2.5 67.3 
   Chinese 151 93.4 90.3 4.0 44.4 
Arts 
     
   History of Art 923 92.4 89.7 3.0 62.1 
   Music Theory 766 71.7 73.1 3.1 47.1 
Notes: This table shows summary statistics broken by AP subject where the unit of observation is a student-year-course. The first column shows the number of 
courses, followed by the percentage of these courses that resulted in an AP exam. The third column adjusts for FRL, female, race, Hispanic, and grade, and is the 
predicted exam-taking percentage for the average student along each of these characteristics. The fourth column is the average AP exam grade received conditional 
on taking the exam. The final column is the percentage female. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: AP Exam-taking Behavior 
#AP Courses % Take 0 Exams % Take All Exams Mean # Exams N 
1 16.6 83.4 0.8 53,679 
2 8.1 79.2 1.7 22,194 
3 4.4 75.5 2.6 10,939 
4 3.3 71.2 3.5 5,507 
5 2.0 66.2 4.4 2,130 
6-9 1.4 57.3 5.3 625 
Notes: This student-year level table shows AP exam-taking behavior for students enrolled in different number of courses (denoted in column 1). Students taking 
6 through 9 courses are combined. The second column shows the percentage of students in the row who take 0 exams, while the third column shows the 
percentage of students in the row who take all of their exams. The fourth column shows the mean number of exams taken. 
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Table 2.4: Predicted AP Exam Scores 
Predicted AP grade Courses that did not 
lead to AP exam in 
this grade band 
Courses that did not 
lead to AP exam in 
this grade band as 
percent of total 
number of courses 
that did not lead to 
an AP exam 
# Total courses in 
this grade band 
irrespective of the 
AP exam being 
taken or not 
Courses that did not 
lead to AP exam as 
percent of all AP 
courses in this grade 
band 
<1 4122 13.7 12251 33.6 
[1, 1.5) 4883 16.2 17373 28.1 
[1.5, 2) 5842 19.4 23586 24.8 
[2, 2.5) 5783 19.2 29212 19.8 
[2.5, 3) 4553 15.1 32743 13.9 
[3, 3.5) 2831 9.4 32296 8.8 
[3.5, 4) 1421 4.7 25759 5.5 
[4, 4.5) 511 1.7 14427 3.5 
>=4.5 179 0.6 7131 2.5 
Total 30125 100.0 194778  
Notes: This is a student-course-year level table where the counts are number of individual courses. Actual AP scores are in integer values from 1 to 5. Our 
predicted AP scores are continuous and unbounded. In this table we present the predicted AP scores in buckets of 0.5 increments.    
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Table 2.5: Determinants of AP Exam Taking 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FRL -0.036** 0.004 0.021* 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Female  0.005* -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Black  -0.110*** -0.067*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.038*** 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
Asian  0.020** 0.005 0.013* 0.013* 0.003 0.003 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other  -0.042*** -0.027** -0.004 -0.004 -0.019*** -0.018*** 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) 
Hispanic  -0.043*** -0.023** -0.004 -0.003 -0.015** -0.013** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) 
Grade Level = 10   0.020 0.047  0.034  
   (0.037) (0.035)  (0.029)  
Grade Level = 11   -0.017 -0.008  -0.017  
   (0.035) (0.033)  (0.027)  
Grade Level = 12   -0.083** -0.068**  -0.077***  
   (0.036) (0.034)  (0.028)  
Numeric Grade   0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.909*** 0.927*** 0.198*** 0.278*** 0.209*** 0.195*** 0.191*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.072) (0.062) (0.068) (0.056) (0.056) 
        
Observations 194,778 194,778 194,778 194,778 194,778 194,778 194,778 
R-squared 0.038 0.057 0.111 0.137 0.146 0.196 0.223 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Course FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
District FE    YES    
District-Grade FE     YES   
School FE      YES  
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School-Grade FE       YES 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 
Notes: Observations are at the student-course-year level. The dependent variable is a binary variable for taking the AP exam. Standard errors are clustered at the 
school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table 2.6: Determinants of AP Exam Taking 
Panel A: Districts 1 and 2 (Same Subsidy for All Students) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FRL -0.064*** 0.019 0.029 -0.000 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) 
        
Observations 68,169 68,169 68,169 68,169 68,169 68,169 68,169 
R-squared 0.026 0.066 0.104 0.164 0.168 0.247 0.290 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.897 
 
Panel B: Districts 3 and 4 (Higher Subsidy for FRL Students than non-FRL Students) 
FRL -0.003 0.019 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) 
        
Observations 126,609 126,609 126,609 126,609 126,609 126,609 126,609 
R-squared 0.057 0.069 0.135 0.135 0.137 0.184 0.200 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Course FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
District FE    YES    
District-Grade FE     YES   
School FE      YES  
School-Grade FE       YES 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 0.818 0.818 0.818 0.818 0.818 0.818 0.818 
Notes: Observations at the student-year-course level. The dependent variable is an indicator for taking the AP exam. Demographic controls are Female, Asian, 
Black, Other, and Hispanic. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.7: Number of Exams Taken 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Districts 
1 & 2  
Same 
subsidy 
for all 
Districts 1 
& 2: FRL 
Only 
 
Districts 1 & 2: 
Non-FRL Only 
 
Districts 3 
& 4  
Different 
subsidy by 
FRL 
Districts 3 
& 4: FRL 
Only 
Districts 3 
& 4: non-
FRL Only 
Full Sample 
with Number 
of 
Subsidized 
Exams 
FRL 0.025*** -0.012   0.040***   -0.012 
 (0.009) (0.008)   (0.011)   (0.009) 
Female 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.003 -0.001 0.013 -0.010 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) 
Black -0.048*** -0.000 -0.006 0.001 -0.067*** -0.034** -0.068*** -0.051*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) 
Asian 0.017** 0.020 0.060** 0.013 0.008 0.053*** 0.001 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.029) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) 
Other -0.027*** 0.010 0.019 0.008 -0.038*** -0.012 -0.054*** -0.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.027) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) 
Hispanic -0.011 0.021* 0.016 0.019* -0.022* -0.008 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.024) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) 
Avg. Course Grade 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
# Courses 0.901*** 0.939*** 0.899*** 0.945*** 0.880*** 0.920*** 0.854*** 0.859*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.030) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) 
# Subsidized Tests        0.075*** 
        (0.018) 
         
Observations 95,074 35,834 7,655 28,179 59,240 23,393 35,847 95,074 
R-squared 0.809 0.862 0.753 0.876 0.776 0.787 0.773 0.810 
Mean of Dpt. Variable 1.506 1.584 1.264 1.671 1.459 1.381 1.510 1.506 
Notes: Observations are at the student-year level. The dependent variable is the number of AP exams taken by the student in a year. All columns include School-
Grade and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.8: Determinants of AP Exam Taking: Gender 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
Full Sample AP Subjects with 0-40% 
Female Participation 
AP Subjects with 40-60% 
Female Participation 
AP Subjects with 60-100% 
Female Participation 
Female -0.011*** -0.016 -0.011*** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) 
Teacher Female -0.001 -0.046 0.014** -0.013 
 (0.006) (0.047) (0.007) (0.016) 
Female-Teacher 
Female 0.005 0.017 -0.001 0.010 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007) 
     
Observations 192,842 7,131 138,000 47,711 
R-squared 0.226 0.381 0.241 0.217 
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 0.847 0.752 0.849 0.856 
Notes: Observations are at the student-year-course level. The dependent variable is a binary variable for taking the AP exam. Observations with missing teacher 
gender are dropped. All columns include School-Grade, course, and year fixed effects, and control for Asian, Black, Other, and Hispanic. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.9: Number of Exams Taken, Ninth-Eleventh Grade and Twelfth Grade Samples 
Panel A: Ninth-Eleventh Grade Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Full Sample Districts 
1 & 2  
 
Districts 1 
& 2: FRL 
Only 
Districts 1 & 2: 
Non-FRL Only 
 
Districts 3 
& 4  
 
Districts 3 
& 4: FRL 
Only 
Districts 3 
& 4: non-
FRL Only 
Full Sample with 
# Subsidized 
Tests 
FRL 0.003 -0.004   0.007   -0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.007) 
# Courses 0.948*** 0.974*** 0.961*** 0.976*** 0.935*** 0.964*** 0.916*** 0.925*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
#Subsidized Tests        0.043*** 
        (0.011) 
Observations 69,038 25,018 5,084 19,934 44,020 16,998 27,022 69,038 
R-squared 0.844 0.886 0.778 0.900 0.822 0.817 0.826 0.844 
Mean of Dpt. Variable 1.416 1.428 1.182 1.490 1.409 1.333 1.456 1.416 
 
Panel B: Twelfth Grade Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Full Sample Districts 
1 & 2  
 
Districts 1 
& 2: FRL 
Only 
Districts 1 & 2: 
Non-FRL Only 
 
Districts 3 
& 4  
 
Districts 3 
& 4: FRL 
Only 
Districts 3 
& 4: non-
FRL Only 
Full Sample with 
# Subsidized 
Tests 
FRL 0.079*** -0.031   0.130***   0.000 
 (0.022) (0.023)   (0.027)   (0.018) 
# Courses 0.852*** 0.910*** 0.854*** 0.920*** 0.815*** 0.866*** 0.783*** 0.788*** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.046) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.033) (0.030) 
#Subsidized Tests        0.109*** 
        (0.028) 
Observations 26,036 10,816 2,571 8,245 15,220 6,395 8,825 26,036 
R-squared 0.765 0.826 0.722 0.836 0.724 0.752 0.709 0.767 
Mean of Dpt. Variable 1.746 1.945 1.427 2.106 1.605 1.508 1.675 1.746 
Notes: Observations are at the student-year level. The dependent variable is the number of AP exams taken by the student in a year. Panel A restricts the sample 
to students in grades 9-11, while Panel B restricts to students in grade 12. All columns include School-Grade and year fixed effects, and control for Asian, Black, 
Other, and Hispanic. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.10: Took All Exams 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full 
Sample 
Districts 
1&2 
Districts 
3&4 
FRL 0.013** -0.002 0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Female -0.002 0.005 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Black -0.034*** 0.004 -0.049*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
Asian 0.002 0.009 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Other -0.023*** 0.002 -0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
Hispanic -0.008 0.015 -0.014* 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Took 2 Courses -0.034*** -0.003 -0.052***  
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
Took 3 Courses -0.070*** -0.017 -0.101***  
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) 
Took 4 Courses -0.085*** -0.031* -0.117***  
(0.017) (0.016) (0.026) 
Took 5 Courses -0.087*** -0.049* -0.110***  
(0.019) (0.025) (0.028) 
Took 6+ Courses -0.150*** -0.103*** -0.178*** 
 (0.039) (0.026) (0.053) 
Observations 95,074 35,834 59,240 
R-squared 0.284 0.320 0.262 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.802 0.860 0.767 
Notes: Observations are at the student-year level. The dependent variable is an indicator for the student taking the same number of exams as courses. All columns 
include average course grade, School-Grade and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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2.7. Appendix 
 
Table A2.1: Credit Granting AP Exam Scores 
AP Course Georgia State 
University 
University of 
Georgia 
Georgia Tech 
University 
Kennesaw State 
University 
Georgia 
Southern 
University 
Perimeter 
College 
World History 3 4 4 4 3 3 
US History 3 4 4 4 3 3 
English Language and 
Composition 
3 5 4 5 3 3 
Government and Politics: 
US 
3 4 4 4 3 3 
Macroeconomics 3 3 4 3 3 3 
Psychology 3 3 4 3 3 3 
English Literature and 
Composition 
4 3 4 5 5 3 
Human Geography 3 5 4 3 3 3 
Environmental Science 4 3 4 3 4 4 
Calculus AB 4 3 4 3 4 3 
Notes: Shows credit granting AP exam scores in major universities and colleges in Georgia for the ten most popular AP courses in our sample. Source: College 
Board. Link: https://apstudents.collegeboard.org/getting-credit-placement/search-policies 
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Table A2.2: Subjects 
District Enrolled Non FRL  Enrolled FRL 
State of GA45  State pays for one AP exam 
One District among 
Districts 1 and 2 
District pays for all exams that are not 
paid by the state or federal funds 
District pays for all exams that are not paid by the 
state or federal funds 
The Other District among 
Districts 1 and 2 
District pays for all exams that are not 
paid by the state or federal funds 
District pays for all exams that are not paid by the 
state or federal funds 
One District among 
Districts 3 and 4 
District pays for one exam 
 
District pays for one exam. 
The state funds one additional exam for any course. 
Students who are eligible for AP exam fee 
reduction pay roughly $53 (depending on the year) 
per exam if they take more than 2 exams 
The Other District among 
Districts 3 and 4 
District pays for one exam. All students 
pay a non-refundable $10 fee.  
District pays for all exams that are not paid by the 
state or federal funds. All students pay a non-
refundable $10 fee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 See https://www.ajc.com/news/local-education/some-fear-change-exam-subsidy-slights-low-income-students/jMvPp7FznJQvZw936Jv6oM/. 
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Table A2.3: Determinants of AP Exam Taking, Taken Any Course in Sequence Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FRL -0.047*** -0.005 0.020* 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
Female  0.008** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Black  -0.116*** -0.057*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.041*** -0.039*** 
  (0.022) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) 
Asian  0.031*** 0.009 0.015** 0.016** 0.002 0.003 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other  -0.041*** -0.021 0.001 0.001 -0.016** -0.015** 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
Hispanic  -0.046*** -0.018 0.001 0.002 -0.014** -0.011** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) 
Grade Level = 10   0.016 0.046 0.024 0.039 -0.059*** 
   (0.034) (0.032) (0.039) (0.027) (0.014) 
Grade Level = 11   -0.022 -0.011 0.023 -0.014 -0.046*** 
   (0.034) (0.030) (0.039) (0.025) (0.015) 
Grade Level = 12   -0.098*** -0.079** 0.005 -0.084*** -0.091*** 
   (0.035) (0.031) (0.041) (0.027) (0.012) 
Numeric Grade   0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.876*** 0.892*** -0.102* -0.040 -0.097* -0.121*** -0.110*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.057) (0.049) (0.057) (0.042) (0.040) 
        
Observations 212,935 212,935 212,935 212,935 212,935 212,935 212,935 
R-squared 0.030 0.049 0.143 0.164 0.171 0.219 0.243 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Course FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
District FE    YES    
District-Grade FE     YES   
School FE      YES  
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School-Grade FE       YES 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.808 
Notes: Observations are at the student-course-year level. The dependent variable is a binary variable for taking the AP exam. The sample includes students who 
took any course in the AP course sequence. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table A2.4: Number of Exams Taken, Taken Any Course in Sequence Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Districts 
1 & 2  
Same 
subsidy 
for all 
Districts 1 
& 2: FRL 
Only 
 
Districts 1 & 2: 
Non-FRL Only 
 
Districts 3 
& 4  
Different 
subsidy by 
FRL 
Districts 3 
& 4: FRL 
Only 
Districts 3 
& 4: non-
FRL Only 
Full Sample 
with Number 
of Subsidized 
Tests 
FRL 0.037*** -0.008   0.054***   -0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.009)   (0.012)   (0.011) 
Female -0.008 -0.007 0.000 -0.009 -0.008 0.009 -0.020** -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) 
Black -0.053*** -0.019 -0.025 -0.015 -0.069*** -0.020 -0.075*** -0.057*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) 
Asian 0.019** 0.006 0.061* -0.001 0.015 0.077*** 0.002 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.031) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) 
Other -0.023** -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.031** 0.005 -0.053*** -0.028*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.035) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) 
Hispanic -0.011 0.004 -0.002 0.010 -0.017 0.006 -0.009 -0.014 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.026) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) 
Avg. Course Grade 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
#Courses 0.861*** 0.924*** 0.873*** 0.929*** 0.832*** 0.876*** 0.806*** 0.811*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.030) (0.014) (0.022) (0.019) (0.027) (0.024) 
#Subsidized Tests        0.094*** 
        (0.020) 
         
Observations 111,115 39,312 8,351 30,961 71,803 28,163 43,640 111,115 
R-squared 0.782 0.847 0.717 0.862 0.751 0.760 0.747 0.784 
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Mean of Dependent 
Variable 1.549 1.582 1.202 1.685 1.531 1.423 1.601 1.549 
Notes: Observations are at the student-year level. The dependent variable is the number of AP exams taken by the student in a year. All columns include School-
Grade and year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A2.5: Number of Exams Taken, # Course Bins 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Districts 
1 & 2  
Same 
subsidy 
for all 
Districts 1 
& 2: FRL 
Only 
 
Districts 1 & 2: 
Non-FRL Only 
 
Districts 3 
& 4  
Different 
subsidy by 
FRL 
Districts 3 
& 4: FRL 
Only 
Districts 3 
& 4: non-
FRL Only 
Full Sample 
with Number 
of Subsidized 
Tests 
FRL 0.025*** -0.012   0.040***   -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.008)   (0.011)   (0.009) 
Female 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.003 -0.001 0.014* -0.011 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Black -0.049*** -0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.069*** -0.036** -0.069*** -0.052*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) 
Asian 0.015* 0.020 0.066** 0.013 0.007 0.050*** 0.001 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.030) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) 
Other -0.028*** 0.010 0.020 0.008 -0.038*** -0.011 -0.055*** -0.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.027) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008) 
Hispanic -0.012 0.021* 0.018 0.019 -0.023* -0.010 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.024) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) 
Avg. Course Grade 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Took 2 Courses 0.875*** 0.931*** 0.904*** 0.941*** 0.844*** 0.883*** 0.812*** 0.828*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.026) (0.022) 
Took 3 Courses 1.779*** 1.885*** 1.843*** 1.896*** 1.717*** 1.760*** 1.679*** 1.691*** 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.051) (0.035) (0.041) (0.044) (0.050) (0.044) 
Took 4 Courses 2.711*** 2.828*** 2.666*** 2.849*** 2.641*** 2.727*** 2.580*** 2.577*** 
 (0.044) (0.061) (0.133) (0.056) (0.057) (0.069) (0.063) (0.061) 
Took 5 Courses 3.653*** 3.758*** 3.560*** 3.780*** 3.592*** 3.778*** 3.474*** 3.475*** 
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 (0.054) (0.073) (0.194) (0.065) (0.074) (0.067) (0.089) (0.081) 
Took 6+ Courses 4.675*** 4.680*** 4.223*** 4.715*** 4.651*** 5.130*** 4.429*** 4.475*** 
 (0.131) (0.096) (0.511) (0.079) (0.174) (0.151) (0.193) (0.158) 
#Subsidized Tests        0.077*** 
        (0.018) 
         
Observations 95,074 35,834 7,655 28,179 59,240 23,393 35,847 95,074 
R-squared 0.808 0.863 0.755 0.876 0.775 0.786 0.771 0.809 
Mean of Dpt. Variable 1.506 1.584 1.264 1.671 1.459 1.381 1.510 1.506 
Notes: Observations at the student-year level. The dependent variable is the number of AP exams taken. Courses over are 6 are grouped into the 6 bins. Course = 
1 is the omitted category. All columns include School-Grade and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.6: Took All Exams, Ninth-Eleventh Grade and Twelfth Grade Samples 
Panel A: Ninth-Eleventh Grade Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full 
Sample 
Districts 
1&2 
Districts 
3&4 
FRL 0.001 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Took 2 Courses -0.020*** 0.007 -0.035*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Took 3 Courses -0.047*** -0.007 -0.068*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.020) 
Took 4 Courses -0.066*** -0.014 -0.093*** 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.029) 
Took 5 Courses -0.077*** -0.014 -0.106*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.032) 
Took 6+ Courses -0.080 0.021 -0.118 
 (0.075) (0.024) (0.095) 
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Observations 69,038 25,018 44,020 
R-squared 0.225 0.320 0.186 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.861 0.897 0.841 
 
Panel B: Twelfth Grade Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full 
Sample 
Districts 
1&2 
Districts 
3&4 
FRL 0.041*** -0.002 0.061*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
Took 2 Courses -0.065*** -0.020 -0.094*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) 
Took 3 Courses -0.110*** -0.031 -0.166*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) 
Took 4 Courses -0.114*** -0.046* -0.159*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.029) 
Took 5 Courses -0.112*** -0.065* -0.142*** 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.032) 
Took 6+ Courses -0.187*** -0.129*** -0.225*** 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.048) 
Observations 26,036 10,816 15,220 
R-squared 0.266 0.286 0.204 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.646 0.775 0.554 
Notes: Observations are at the student-year level. The dependent variable is an indicator for the student taking the same number of exams as courses. Panel A 
restricts the sample to students in grades 9-11, while Panel B restricts to students in grade 12. All columns include School-Grade and year fixed effects, and 
control for average course grade, Asian, Black, Other, and Hispanic. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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2.8. Appendix: Additional Details of the Data 
 
AP Test Data 
The format in which the raw AP score data arrived was not uniform across districts. Two 
districts provide one file per school year; such files contain test scores for students who took a test 
in the current year and in previous years. For these files, we only consider exams for the year of 
the file. We also drop the small number (far less than 1 percent) of cases for which a student-year 
appears multiple times in a file (which we think mainly occur due to imperfect fuzzy matching). 
The other two districts provided us a file that they had already cleaned; if we observe a student-
year-test that appears twice, we keep the one with the higher score. For all data, if we are missing 
a unique identifier—which prevents us from matching to the course data—we drop these instances. 
Dropping these observations and the observations identified earlier in the paragraph will cause us 
to very slightly underestimate the percentage of students taking the corresponding AP exam. 
In cases where we observe that the student took a test, but do not observe the test score 
(often because the test is still pending or the score has been canceled) or being coded as having a 
0 score, we code the student as having taken the test, but record the score variable as missing. 
Thus, these individuals are not used in the first step of the prediction exercise. 
Course Data 
We first process the course data within district. In the very rare instances that a student has 
multiple observations for a district-year-course-term, we keep the observation that is not a transfer 
credit (if one is and one is not), and then break ties with the higher credits earned and then higher 
exam score. In some instances, students do not take semester courses (S1, S2) and take one of four 
9-week terms (N1, N2, N3, N4) or year-long courses (Y1). In order to decide which observation 
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is the terminal course (for the final sample), we create a hierarchy as follows, where we choose 
the observation appearing latest: N1, N2, S1, N3, N4, S2, Y1.  
Not all subjects appear in all districts. Two AP courses map to the same English AP exam. 
We treat both courses as being the same. In some cases, the observation in the main data set is 
coded with a teacher denoting that it is a transfer course; they represent less than 0.1 percent of 
observations of the data (before restricting to the terminal course dataset), and we keep them in 
the data. 
It is very rare that a student’s course will be associated with multiple teachers. In these 
cases, we only consider the first-listed teacher and use his/her demographics. We construct the 
teacher gender variables within district-year, but using information from three separate files. In 
cases of disagreement between the files, we assign them female if any are female. 
Combined Data 
When we aggregate from the student-course-year level to the student-year level, there is a 
very small number of cases in which variables are not constant within student-year. If a student 
transferred schools or districts, their demographics could vary within year. If they do, we consider 
the student to be female if any observation if female, other race if not all observations have the 
same race, Hispanic if any observation is Hispanic, and FRL if any observation is FRL. We assign 
them the latest-occurring school and district if unique. In the extremely rare cases of ties, we go 
with the school/district in which the course was not a transfer course and in the other instance the 
school/district that had the highest number of courses. When constructing the sample for the Full 
Sample of Table 2.1 (Summary Statistics), we use all students who appear in both the demographic 
and course data files, keeping the observation with the highest grade in rare cases of a student 
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appearing with multiple grades. We follow a similar process as above in cases of transfer students; 
if there was still a tie after the above process, we break it randomly.
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3. ACA Coverage Impacts in the Trump Era46 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Almost halfway through the fourth year of the Trump administration, the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) and its impact on insurance coverage remains a contentious political issue. The most 
recent example is the fact that while eleven states and the District of Columbia have opened 
enrollment in their state Marketplaces to allow workers laid-off as a result of the coronavirus, the 
Trump administration is not currently planning to open the federal Marketplace.  Despite the fact 
that the president has stated Republicans are doing a great job managing the ACA, his 
administration is supporting the challenge to the ACA’s constitutionality that will go before the 
Supreme Court this fall.  Given this ongoing debate it is natural to ask how insurance coverage 
under the ACA has fared during the Trump administration.  
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the causal effect of the ACA on insurance coverage 
by type during 2017 and 2018, the first two years of the Trump administration, using data from 
the American Community Survey (ACS). While a large literature has developed on the coverage 
impacts of the ACA (Courtemanche, Marton, and Yelowitz, 2016; Obama, 2016; Gruber and 
Sommers, 2019), to our knowledge only one prior publication (Courtemanche et al., 2020b) has 
included both 2017 and 2018 data.  Courtemanche et al. (2020b) found continued gains in overall 
coverage in 2017 and 2018, but were unable to differentiate between different types of insurance 
 
46 This chapter is co-authored with the following people. Charles Courtemanche: U. of Kentucky, Dept. of 
Economics, Gatton College of Business and Economics, Lexington, KY, 40506-0034, USA; 859-323-7900; 
courtemanche@uky.edu. James Marton, Georgia State U., P.O. Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302-3992, USA; 404-
413-0256; marton@gsu.edu. Benjamin Ukert: Texas A&M U., Dept. of Health Policy and Management, 212 
Adriance Lab Road, 1266 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-1266; 979-436-9056; bukert@tamu.edu. Aaron 
Yelowitz: U. of Kentucky, Dept. of Economics, Gatton School of Business and Economics, Lexington, KY, 40506-
0034, USA; 859-257-7634; aaron@uky.edu. Daniela Zapata: Impaq International, 11325 G Street, NW, Suite 
900, Washington, DC 20005, USA; 202-774-1981; dzapata@impaqint.com. 
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coverage given the way insurance information is collected in the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System (BRFSS). Thus our paper contributes to the literature by providing estimates 
on the impact of the ACA on overall coverage in 2017 and 2018 from the ACS to compare to those 
from the BRFSS, as well as being the first to provide estimates by type of coverage.  
There were several key events associated with the ACA occurring in 2017 and 2018 which 
might be expected to influence the effect of the ACA on insurance coverage. First, President 
Trump’s first executive order in January of 2017 encouraged the federal government to waive or 
delay the implementation of any features of the ACA that would impose a burden, either financial 
or regulatory (White House, 2017).  Second, funding for ACA outreach and education programs 
was reduced for open enrollment periods associated with 2017 and 2018 plans (GAO, 2018). Third, 
the administration discontinued cost sharing reduction (CSR) payments to insurers for silver 
Marketplace plans in October 2017 (HHS, 2017). Finally, political debate surrounding the ACA 
persisted, including the failed vote to repeal the ACA in July 2017 and the vote to pass the tax 
reform package that included a repeal of the ACA individual coverage mandate in December 2017 
(Commonwealth Fund, 2018). The addition of 2017 and 2018 ACS data allows us to examine the 
initial causal impact of these events on insurance coverage by type, such as private vs. Medicaid 
coverage. Recent descriptive evidence suggests that coverage actually fell by about 0.5 percentage 
points between 2017 and 2018 (Berchick et al., 2019). 
Our primary methodological approach, borrowing from the recent ACA literature, involves 
estimating difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) models with the differences coming 
from time, state Medicaid expansion status, and local area pretreatment uninsured rate in order to 
estimate the impact of the fully implemented ACA (Courtemanche et al., 2017; Courtemanche et 
al., 2018a; Courtemanche et al., 2018b).  This approach differs from much of the initial ACA 
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literature, which employed simpler difference-in-differences (DD) models comparing changes in 
expansion states to non-expansion states in order to identify the effect of the ACA Medicaid 
expansion alone. Identifying the impact of the national components of the ACA, such as the 
individual mandate and subsidized Marketplace coverage, requires a different approach because 
they were implemented in every state at the same time. The inclusion of a third difference handles 
the fact that the national components of the ACA were implemented in every state at the same 
time. Our third difference identifies the combined effect of these national components because 
they should provide the most intense “treatment” in local areas with the highest uninsured rates 
prior to the ACA.  
  In non-expansion states, which should be impacted by the national components of 
the ACA alone, we see statistically significantly smaller coverage increases in 2017 and 2018 (3.8 
percentage points in each year relative to pre-ACA) as compared to 2016, where we estimate a 5 
percentage point increase relative to pre-ACA. In expansion states, which should be impacted both 
by the national components of the ACA and the Medicaid expansion, we estimate similar gains in 
coverage in 2016 through 2018 (about 11 percentage points in each year relative to pre-ACA). 
This difference between expansion and non-expansion states is due smaller year over year 
increases in coverage due to the national components of the ACA and larger year over year 
increases due to the Medicaid expansion. 
3.2. Data 
 
Our analysis uses data from 2011 through 2018 waves of the American Community Survey 
(ACS). The ACS is the most comprehensive survey of the U.S. population across all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia, sampling roughly one percent annually or about three million individual 
respondents per year. Its mandatory nature reduces sample selection concerns and provides a high 
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and stable response rate. For the purpose of our study we restrict the sample to respondents aged 
19 to 64 because this was the ACAs target population. We only use data starting in 2011 to avoid 
measuring the ACAs effect of provisions enacted in 2010 and because the three pre-2014 ACA 
years provide us with a pre-treatment period which we use to evaluate the plausibility of the 
assumptions of our econometric model. 
In terms of geographic identifiers, the ACS includes a state identifier for each respondent 
and an identifier for the respondents Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), which represent an area 
within state of at least 100,000 people.  The PUMA identifier is important for our study because it 
better represents local characteristics than a state identifier. Our empirical strategy relies on within-
state variation in uninsured rates in 2013 to identify the causal effect of the ACA marketplace. 
Ideally, we would use the local PUMAs within a state to identify uninsured rates, however the 
PUMA definition changed during our sample period, and the new boundaries were applied to the 
2013 ACS wave and later. As a result, we cannot continuously identify the respondents’ 
geographic area from 2011 to 2018. We follow Courtemanche et al. (2017) and identifying core-
based statistical areas (CBSAs) identifiable in all years using the old and new PUMA classification 
systems. A complicating factor with CBSAs is that they can span multiple states and we isolate 
the portion of the CBSA in each state as separate local areas. CBSAs also do not cover all areas 
within a state, to avoid dropping respondents in unassigned areas we create additional local areas 
for the non-CBSA portion in each state. These adjustments avoid dropping respondents. After 
making these aforementioned adjustments, our dataset consists of 630 local CBSA and non-CBSA 
areas that each contain between 356 and 78,781 respondents in 2013, with a median of 1,020 and 
a mean of 2,811 respondents.  
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The ACS includes a wide number of socio-demographic characteristics for each 
respondent. We take advantage of a question on health insurance coverage to estimate the 2013 
local uninsured rates and also to evaluate the effect on insurance coverage after the 2014 ACA 
provisions took effect. Specifically, the ACS health insurance question asks at the time of the 
survey if the person is currently coved by any time of health insurance and provides a list of eight 
types of health insurance categories to choose from. These include “insurance though a current or 
former employer or union”, “insurance purchased directly from an insurance company”, 
“Medicare”, “Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or any kind of government-assistance plan for those 
with low incomes or a disability”, “TRICARE or other military health care”, “VA (including those 
who have ever used or enrolled for VA health care)”, “Indian Health Service”, and “any other type 
of health insurance or health coverage plan.”  Answers are not mutually exclusive, and a 
respondent can choose to answer more than one type of coverage or choose to answer “no” to all 
eight categories as uninsured. Based on the health insurance question we create six indicator 
variables that are equal to one if an individuals responded “yes” to any insurance option, any 
private insurance (either employer sponsored or directly purchased), employer-sponsored 
insurance, directly purchased insurance, Medicaid, and any other coverage (defined as coverage 
as neither private nor Medicaid coverage).  
Other socioeconomic variables in the ACS that we use as control variables in our models 
cover gender, race/ethnicity, origin, family structure, education, labor force participation, and 
household income. Specifically, we create binary variables for the age of the respondent (binary 
indicators for each year from 19 to 64), female, race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic 
black, Hispanic, and other race/ethnicity), foreign born, U.S. citizenship status, married, and 
separate binary variables counting the number of children under the age of 18 living in the 
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household (one, two, three, four, and five or more). We group educational attainment into indicator 
for the highest level of completed education (less than a high school degree, high school degree, 
some college, and college graduate), and we measure labor force participation with binary 
variables indicating whether the individual is a student or not, whether the individual is 
unemployed or not. We measure household income in our regression relative to the Federal 
Poverty Limit (FPL), and then create 50 dummy variables measuring the separate impact for each 
10-point increment of income as a percentage of the FPL (with the highest category including 
everyone over 500 percent of the FPL). Lastly, we also include as a control variable the annual 
state unemployment rate collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Our second binary independent variable of interest, whether and when a state expanded 
Medicaid via the ACA, was collected from the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF, 2020). The 
majority of states expanded Medicaid effective January 1, 2014, but several states expanded at a 
later time. At the end of 2018, 31 states and the District of Columbia expanded their Medicaid 
program and seven states expanded Medicaid after January 1, 2014.  We assign the starting date 
of these states’ Medicaid expansions in our expansion indicator accordingly. We also collect 
information from the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF, 2020) and Kowalski (2014) regarding the 
implementation of the 2014 ACA insurance marketplaces. Several states struggled with the initial 
rollout of the marketplace enrollment platform. We include binary variables indicating whether a 
state set up their own state-run insurance exchange and whether the exchange experienced glitches 
in 2014. We include these variables to control for differential responses in take-up in the individual 
marketplace related to initial troubles in outreach and sign-up of uninsured individuals. 
Summary statistics are displayed in table 3.1 for our six health insurance coverage 
outcomes in 2013 for the full sample as well as stratified by state Medicaid expansion decision 
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and whether the uninsurance rate was above or below the median. In the full sample the average 
baseline insurance rate was 79 percent in 2013, with 67 percent having private coverage, 60 percent 
having employer sponsored coverage, 9.4 percent having individually purchased coverage, about 
11 percent having Medicaid coverage, and 3 percent having other types of coverage. In Medicaid 
expansion states (columns 2 and 3) the percent of individuals reporting any coverage was slightly 
higher than in non-expansion states (columns 4 and 5). The somewhat higher average level of 2013 
coverage stems from a higher proportion of individuals having Medicaid coverage in (future) 
expansion states. These baseline differences provide the first evidence that 2013 uninsured rates 
and Medicaid expansion status may be appropriate sources of variation for our analysis. To give a 
rough sense of how coverage changes over time, figure 3.1 plots changes in insurance coverage 
by type over time for our sample, also stratified by expansion status and 2013 uninusrance rate.   
3.3. Methods  
 
In order to uncover the causal impact of the ACA on coverage disparities after five years, 
we follow the recent ACA literature by estimating DDD models with the differences come from 
time, state Medicaid expansion decisions, and pre-ACA local area uninsured rates (Courtemanche 
et al., 2017; Courtemanche et al., 2018a; Courtemanche et al., 2018b). Our baseline DDD 
regression equation is given by equation (1) below. 
𝑦𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 𝛾2(𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 
𝛾3(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 𝛾4𝑿𝒊𝒂𝒔𝒕 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛼𝑎𝑠 + 𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡             
(1) 
where  
• 𝑦𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 is an indicator of insurance coverage for individual i in local area a in state s in year 
t,  
• 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 is an indicator for whether period t is in the post-reform period of 2014 or later, 
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• 𝑋𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 is a vector of control variables previously described, 
•  𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 is an indicator for whether state s participated in the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion in year t,  
• 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 is the 2013 (pre-ACA) uninsured rate in local area a within state s, 
• 𝜃𝑡 denotes year fixed effects, 
• 𝛼𝑎𝑠 denotes local area fixed effects,  
• and 𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 is a standard error term.   
The term 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 is not separately included in equation (1) since it is absorbed by the year fixed 
effects, while the terms 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 are not separately included since they are 
absorbed by the local area fixed effects. 
The effect of the ACA without the Medicaid expansion is given by 𝛾1 * 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠, 
which means it is assumed to be zero in a (hypothetical) area with a 0 percent uninsured rate at 
baseline and to increase linearly as the pre-ACA uninsured rate rises (Courtemanche et al., 2017). 
Similarly, the effect of the Medicaid expansion alone is given by 𝛾3 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗
𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 , meaning it is zero in non-expansion states (where 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 = 0) and 𝛾3 ∗
𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠  in expansion states (where 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠𝑡 = 1 ). We consider 𝛾2  to represent 
unobserved confounders rather than capturing part of the expansion’s causal effect, since the 
Medicaid expansion should not causally affect coverage in an area with a 0 percent baseline 
uninsured rate. The effect of the “fully implemented” ACA, i.e. in Medicaid expansion states, 
combines the impacts of the Medicaid and non-Medicaid components: 𝛾1 * 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 +
𝛾3 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠. In our results we report the predicted effect of the ACA at the sample mean 
pretreatment uninsured rate. Formally, this predicted effect is given by 𝛾1 * 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  in 
non-expansion states and 𝛾1 * 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  in expansion states.  
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While estimates based on equation (1) provide average effects over the 2014-2018 time 
period, we are primarily interested in how the effects varied over time across these five years, 
especially in 2017 and 2018. In order to analyze changes over time, we estimate event-study 
models as our preferred set of specifications, where we replace 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 with a set of year dummies. 
The event study DDD model is  
𝑦𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 𝜑 + ∑ 𝜃𝑡(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑌𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑡(𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑌𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑡(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑌𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
+ 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑎𝑠 + 𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 
(2) 
where Yt, is an indicator for whether year t is 2011, 2012, …, 2018, respectively for t = 1, 2,…,7,  
with 2013 being the omitted reference year and the other terms being as described in equation (1). 
Here the effects of the ACA without the Medicaid expansion during 2014, 2015, …, 2018 are 
given by 𝜃3 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ,  𝜃4 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ,   …, 𝜃7 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠  respectively, 
while the effects of the Medicaid expansion in 2014, 2015, …, 2018 are similarly given by 𝛽3 ∗
𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 , 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 , … 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠.  
This event study model also allows us to test the identifying assumptions from our main 
DDD specification (Courtemanche et al., 2017; Courtemanche et al., 2018a). The identifying 
assumption for the effect of ACA without Medicaid expansion is that, in the absence of the ACA, 
any changes in the outcomes that would have occurred in 2014–2018 would not have been 
systematically correlated with local area uninsured rates, conditional on the controls. The 
identifying assumption for the impact of Medicaid expansion is that, in the absence of ACA, the 
differential changes in the outcomes in 2014–2018 between Medicaid expansion and non-
expansion states would not have been correlated with pre-reform uninsured rates. If the event study 
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suggests evidence that changes in the outcomes from 2011-2013 are correlated with pre-ACA 
uninsured rates (i.e. 𝜃1 or 𝜃2 are significant) or the interaction of the local area uninsured rate with 
Medicaid expansion status (i.e. 𝛽1 or 𝛽2 are significant), this would suggest problems with these 
assumptions.  
We also estimate a number of robustness checks. The first one is excluding 19-25-year 
olds, who were affected by the dependent coverage provision of the ACA that was implemented 
in 2010; thus, were partially affected prior to 2013. Robustness checks two to six consist of 
dropping states that expanded Medicaid at different points in time (KFF, 2020). In the second and 
third checks we drop early expansion states using two different specification - states that expanded 
between April 2010 and March 201247 and states that expanded prior to 201048. In the fourth, fifth 
and sixth checks we drop all early expanders, all late expanders and early and late expanders 
respectively. In the seventh specification check we include Medicaid*Uininsured in the DDD 
analysis and in the eighth specification check we use state level uninsured rates with additional 
state controls.  
3.4. Results 
 
Table 3.2 provides our combined post-ACA results. Here we report implied effects of the 
ACA that multiply the coefficient estimates from equation (1) by the local average pre-treatment 
2013 uninsured rate (20.3 percent). Each column represents results from a different regression that 
measures the effect of the ACA on a different coverage outcome. The first row displays the implied 
effect of the national portion of the ACA, including the health insurance marketplaces, the 
 
47 These states include California, Connecticut, Washington DC, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington. 
48 These 5 states are: Delaware, Washington DC, Massachusetts, New Your, and Vermont. These early expanders 
were also excluded by Kaestner et al., 2017. 
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individual mandate, etc., while the second row displays the effect for the Medicaid expansion 
alone. The last row displays the full effect of the ACA, which is the expected change for an area 
that was treated both by the national portion of the ACA as well as the Medicaid expansion. 
Table 3.2 shows that the probability of having any coverage increased by 3.7 percentage 
points from the national portion of the ACA between 2014 and 2018 relative to pre-ACA period. 
The Medicaid expansion contributed a 5.3 percentage point increase in having any coverage during 
the same time period. The full effect of the ACA, which is a combination of these two effects, was 
a 9.1 percentage point increase in having any coverage. The fully implemented ACA also increased 
private coverage by 2.6 percentage points (column 2), which was driven by the national portion of 
the law (a 3.3 percentage point increase). Employer sponsored coverage increased by 1.8 
percentage points (column 3) and individually purchased coverage increased by 0.9 percentage 
points due to the fully implemented ACA (column 4). Finally, Column 5 shows that the fully 
implemented ACA increased Medicaid coverage by 6.8 percentage points and that effect is driven 
by the Medicaid expansion (which represents a 6.2 percentage point increase).  
The validity of the identifying assumptions of our baseline DDD model cannot be tested 
directly. We can, however, test their validity indirectly by examining the pre-ACA coefficients 
from an event study model where we interact the treatment variables with the full set of year fixed 
effects, treating 2013 to as the base year. We report the results from this event study analysis 
separately in tables 3.3 and 3.4. Table 3.3 reports only the estimated pre-treatment (2011 and 2012) 
coefficients from the event study, while table 3.4 reports only the post-treatment implied effects 
(for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018). This split allows us to focus on the indirect test 
of our identifying assumptions in table 3.3 and decomposing the year-by-year effects of the ACA 
in the post-period in table 3.4.  
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With that in mind, we first examine the results from table 3.3. The numbers reported in 
table 3.3 are not implied effects but estimated coefficients taken directly from the estimation of 
equation (2). Ideally, we want to see no more of the pre-2013 coefficients to be significant than 
we should expect by chance, which is around 5 percent. A substantially higher percentage would 
call our identification strategy into question by suggesting an “impact” of the ACA even before it 
was implemented. We see that 2 out of 24 coefficients (8.3 percent) are significant in table 3.3.49 
Moreover, results of an F test for the joint significance of all pre-ACA interactions show that we 
can reject the null that there is no effect in just one instance, the effect of ACA without the 
Medicaid expansion on individually purchased insurance.50 In all other cases, we are unable to 
reject the null that there was no effect of the national components of ACA or the Medicaid 
expansion alone in 2012 and 2013 on the various different sources of insurance coverage. These 
findings give us confidence in a casual interpretation of our results. 
Table 3.4 reports the post-treatment implied effects (for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 
and 2018) from the same event study model that generates the results reported in table 3.3. Along 
with the indicators for statistical significance of the change in insurance coverage relative to the 
base year of 2013, this table includes indicators to show if the estimates are statistically 
significantly different in 2017 and 2018 (the first two years of the Trump administration) relative 
to 2016. Three sets of implied effects are reported in table 3.4: the impact of the ACA without the 
Medicaid expansion in panel I, the impact of Medicaid expansion alone in panel II, and the impact 
of the full ACA with Medicaid expansion (which is the sum of the first two effects) in panel III. 
 
49 The two pre-reform significant effects show up on the coefficient for Uninsurance Rate*2011 and Uninsurance 
Rate*2012 when the dependent variable is individually purchased insurance. This is the coefficient used to calculate 
the effect of the ACA without Medicaid expansion. 
50 We run two F tests for each of the six different outcomes (sources of insurance). The first F test for each outcome 
tests if the coefficients for Uninsurance rate*Medicaid Expansion*2011 and Uninsurance rate*Medicaid 
Expansion*2012 are jointly significant or not. The second F test for each outcome tests if Uninsurance rate*2011 
and Uninsurance rate*2012 are jointly significant or not.  
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Our primary interest here is whether or not we see changes in the impact of the ACA in 
2017 and 2018 as compared to previous years. Panel I reports the impact of the national 
components of the ACA, which led to statistically significantly smaller overall coverage increases 
in 2017 and 2018 (3.8 percentage points in each year) as compared to 2016, where we estimate a 
5 percentage point increase. These smaller increases in overall coverage due to the national 
components of the ACA are being driven primarily by smaller gains from employer sponsored 
insurance (column 3) which in turn contributes to smaller gains in any private insurance. 
Panel II reports the impact of the Medicaid expansion alone, where we see statistically 
significantly larger increases in coverage in 2017 (6.9 percentage points) and 2018 (6.7 percentage 
points) as compared to 2016 (with a 5.7 percentage point increase). Thus, while panel I suggests 
the impact of the national components of the ACA fell during the first two years of the Trump 
administration, panel II suggests that the impact of the Medicaid expansion grew. Not surprisingly, 
column 5 of panel II shows that the growth in overall coverage due to the Medicaid expansion can 
be attributed to increases in the likelihood of reporting Medicaid coverage. 
The results from panel I and panel II allow us to examine the differential impact of the 
ACA on insurance coverage in expansion and non-expansion states. Since non-expansion states 
were only exposed to the national components of the ACA, the results from panel I represents the 
expected impact of the ACA on a typical non-expansion state. Therefore, in a typical non-
expansion state coverage growth due the ACA fell in 2017 and 2018 as compared to 2016. 
Expansion states, on the other hand, were exposed to both the national components of the ACA 
(panel I) and the Medicaid expansion (panel II). The combination of these effects are reported in 
panel III of table 3.4. Panel III suggests that in a typical expansion state increases in coverage 
growth due to the Medicaid coverage in 2017 and 2018 compared to 2016 is offset by smaller rates 
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of coverage growth due to the national components of the ACA. Thus, the fully implemented ACA 
led to a 10.8 percentage point increase in coverage both 2016 and 2017 and a 10.5 percentage point 
increase in 2018 in a typical expansion state (i.e. a plateauing of coverage growth).  
Table 3.5 presents the results of a series of additional specification checks to further assess 
the validity of our combined post-period results from table 3.2. In panel I we exclude 19 to 25-
year olds because they should have been mostly “treated’ with the ACA dependent care coverage 
mandate that came into effect at the end of 2010. We observe a somewhat smaller point estimate 
for the effect of Medicaid expansion on any coverage, which also results in a smaller effect of the 
fully implemented ACA on any coverage. This is perhaps not surprising given that the young 
adults population was targeted by the ACA due to their relatively high rates of pre-reform 
uninsurance. 
In the next five panels we address concerns regarding the timing of state Medicaid 
expansion decisions. Panels II and III drop early expansion states using two different 
classifications of such states and re-estimates our baseline models. In panel II, the states that 
expanded between April 2010 and March 2012 (California, Connecticut, Washington DC, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington) are dropped.51 In panel III, states that expanded before 
2010 (Delaware, Washington DC, Massachusetts, New Your, and Vermont) according to Kaestner 
et al. (2017) are dropped. Panel IV restricts the sample to the 13 treatment states and 16 control 
states that did not have some form of Medicaid expansion prior to January 2014 in order to better 
isolate the full Medicaid expansion effect. Panel V drops states that expanded after January 2014. 
 
51 Source: Kaiser Family Foundation (https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/states-getting-a-jump-start-on-
health/). 
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Panel VI drops all early expanders before 2014 and late expanders after 2014. In all five models 
the results are generally similar to our findings in table 3.2.52  
In panel VII, we test an alternate specification of our DDD model where we add a 
𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 component to equation (1). We don’t control for this component 
in the primary specification as this should be absorbed by the area fixed effect 𝛼𝑎𝑠. We find the 
same effects as our primary specification in this alternate specification.  
Our last specification check presented in panel VIII examines the robustness of our results 
to a different measure of the local area pretreatment uninsured rate. To do this we aggregate the 
2013 uninsurance rate to the state level and add additional controls for labor market and economic 
conditions at the state level. These state level controls include the percent of healthcare jobs out of 
all jobs, the percent of government jobs out of all jobs, and state per capita GDP. This alternate 
specification results in no change in the impact of the fully implemented ACA on coverage, though 
we do see a larger effect of national components of the ACA and a smaller effect of Medicaid 
expansion alone. 
 
52 In panel II, our first version of dropping early expanders results in a statistically insignificant effect of full ACA 
on individually purchased insurance. This is driven by a slightly larger crowding out effect of the Medicaid 
expansion on individually purchased insurance compared to table 2 (a 2 percentage points decrease in individually 
purchased insurance due to the Medicaid expansion in panel II vs. a 1.8 percentage points decrease in table 2) and a 
larger standard error. In panel IV, where the sample is restricted to the 13 treatment states and 16 control states that 
did not have some form of Medicaid expansion prior to January 2014, we find a statistically insignificant effect of 
the fully implemented ACA on employer sponsored and individually purchased insurance. Here, again, the 
statistically insignificant effect of the fully implemented ACA on individually purchased insurance is driven by a 
larger crowding out effect of the Medicaid expansion on private purchase of insurance compared to the baseline 
specification (a 2.1 percentage points decrease in individually purchased insurance due to the Medicaid expansion in 
panel IV vs. a 1.8 percentage points decrease in table 2) and a larger standard error. The statistically insignificant 
effects of the fully implemented ACA on employer sponsored insurance is driven by a smaller positive effect of the 
Medicaid expansion on employer sponsored insurance compared to baseline specification (a 0.7 percentage point 
increase in employer sponsored insurance due to the Medicaid expansion in panel IV vs a 1.8 percentage point 
increase in table 2) and a larger standard error. When the sample is restricted to only the states that expanded 
Medicaid in 2014 and non-expansion states (Pebl VI), we don’t find any statuistically significant effect of fully 
implemented ACA on private coverage. Also, we find that the Medicaid component of ACA leads to some crowding 
out from the “Other” insurance coverage to Medicaid coverage. None of these changes, however, meaningfully 
change the estimated coverage impacts of the national components of the ACA, the Medicaid expansion, or the fully 
implemented ACA.  
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3.5. Discussion 
 
In this paper we examine the impact of the ACA on insurance coverage during the first two 
years of the Trump administration. During this time period several changes in the management of 
the ACA were debated and implemented, such as reductions in outreach funding, the duration of 
open enrollment, the discontinuation of CSR payments, and the near repeal in 2017. Each of these 
changes may have potentially influenced the coverage impacts of the ACA. 
In non-expansion states, which should be impacted by the national components of the ACA 
alone, we find statistically significantly smaller coverage increases in 2017 and 2018 (3.8 
percentage points in each year) as compared to 2016, where we estimate a 5 percentage point 
increase. In expansion states, which should be impacted both by the national components of the 
ACA and the Medicaid expansion, we estimate similar gains in coverage in 2016 through 2018 
(about 11 percentage points in each year). This difference between expansion and non-expansion 
states is due smaller year over year increases in coverage due to the national components of the 
ACA and larger year over year increases due to the Medicaid expansion. Thus, for expansion states 
we find no evidence that the administrative changes and political debate surrounding the ACA 
during 2017 and 2018 led to differential coverage increases as compared to 2016. However, for 
the non-expansion states we do see smaller coverage increases in 2017 and 2018 compared to 
2016.  
The relatively lower growth in coverage due to the national components of the ACA as 
compared to the Medicaid expansion makes sense since many of the changes brought in by the 
new administration are more likely to negatively influence the Marketplace rather than state 
Medicaid programs. We find that in 2014 and 2015, 52 percent and 50 percent of the total gains in 
coverage come from Medicaid. The contribution of Medicaid in coverage gain in 2017 and 2018 
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increased to 64 percent. This is roughly consistent with Frean et al. (2017) where they find that 60 
percent of the ACA coverage gains in 2014 and 2015 come from Medicaid.  
Even before the advent of the current coronavirus pandemic, debate surrounding health 
policy figured to play a major role in both upcoming national and state elections. Whether or not 
to expand Medicaid is an important policy decision facing many states. The future of the ACA 
more generally will be an important topic in the presidential election this fall. These ongoing 
debates all suggest the need to continue monitoring the evolving impact of the ACA on insurance 
coverage.  
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3.6. Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 3.1: Changes in Insurance Coverage Over Time 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Insurance Coverage  
 
Full sample 
Medicaid 
expansion; 
at or above 
median 
baseline 
uninsured 
Medicaid 
expansion; 
below 
median 
baseline 
uninsured 
Non-
expansion; 
at or above 
median 
baseline 
uninsured 
Non-
expansion; 
below 
median 
baseline 
uninsured 
Any insurance 
coverage 
0.792 
(0.406) 
0.749 
(0.433) 
0.848 
(0.360) 
0.727 
(0.446) 
0.832 
(0.374) 
Any private 0.668 
(0.471) 
0.618 
(0.486) 
0.721 
(0.449) 
0.608 
(0.488) 
0.717 
(0.451) 
Employer-
sponsored 
0.598 
(0.490) 
0.546 
(0.498) 
0.652 
(0.476) 
0.541 
(0.498) 
0.641 
(0.480) 
Individually 
purchased 
0.094 
(0.292) 
0.093 
(0.291) 
0.094 
(0.292) 
0.090 
(0.287) 
0.102 
(0.303) 
Medicaid 0.106 
(0.307) 
0.114 
(0.318) 
0.118 
(0.323) 
0.089 
(0.285) 
0.083 
(0.276) 
Other 0.032 
(0.176) 
0.030 
(0.172) 
0.024 
(0.152) 
0.041 
(0.198) 
0.045 
(0.207) 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 3.2: Implied Effects of the ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate for Full 
Sample 
 Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer-
sponsored 
Individually 
purchased 
Medicaid Other 
Non-elderly adults aged 19-64 (pre-treatment uninsured rate=0.203, sample size=14,091,358) 
ACA without 
Medicaid Expansion 
0.037** 
(0.012) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.027 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicaid    
Expansion 
0.053*** 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
0.062*** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.091*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.068*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated 
at the mean pre-treatment uninsured rate. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in 
parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Sampling weights are 
used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.  
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Table 3.3: Event Study Results for Full Sample – Pre-Reform Coefficients 
 Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer-
sponsored 
Individually 
purchased 
Medicaid Other 
Non-elderly adults aged 19-64 (pre-treatment uninsured rate=0.203, sample size=14,091,358) 
  Unin. Rate* 
  Med. Exp.*2011  
0.028 
(0.030) 
-0.014 
(0.036) 
-0.013 
(0.037) 
-0.025 
(0.021) 
0.033 
(0.030) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
       
  Unin. Rate* 
  Med. Exp.*2012 
-0.012 
(0.038) 
-0.003 
(0.034) 
-0.009 
(0.028) 
-0.010 
(0.025) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
       
  Uninsured  
  Rate*2011 
0.006 
(0.021) 
0.029 
(0.032) 
0.008 
(0.032) 
0.040* 
(0.015) 
-0.012 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
       
  Uninsured  
  Rate*2012 
0.034 
(0.031) 
0.035 
(0.030) 
0.007 
(0.023) 
0.045** 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in 
parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Sampling weights are 
used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects, the full set of controls, Medicaid Expansion*2011, and 
Medicaid Expansion*2012. 
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Table 3.4: Event Study Results for Full Sample – Post-Reform Implied Effects 
 Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer
sponsored 
Individually 
purchased 
Medicaid Other 
Non-elderly adults aged 19-64 (pre-treatment uninsured rate=0.203) 
PANEL I: ACA without Medicaid Expansion 
ACA w/o Medicaid 
Expansion 2014 (A) 
0.029** 
(0.009) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.018 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
ACA w/o Medicaid 
Expansion 2015 (A) 
0.047** 
(0.016) 
0.042** 
(0.013) 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
0.034* 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
ACA w/o Medicaid 
Expansion 2016 (A) 
0.050** 
(0.018) 
0.045** 
(0.014) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.035* 
(0.016) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.0003 
 (0.001) 
ACA w/o Medicaid 
Expansion 2017 (A) 
0.038* 
(0.017)††† 
0.033* 
(0.014)†††  
0.003 
(0.004)†† 
0.034* 
(0.016)  
0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
ACA w/o Medicaid 
Expansion 2018 (A) 
0.038* 
(0.017)††† 
0.038 
(0.015)††† 
0.001 
(0.003)†††  
0.040* 
(0.017)  
0.003 
(0.005)  
-0.002 
(0.001) 
PANEL II: Medicaid Expansion 
Medicaid Expansion 
2014 (B) 
0.032** 
(0.010) 
0.001  
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 
2015 (B) 
0.047** 
(0.016) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
0.060*** 
(0.010) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
Medicaid Expansion 
2016 (B) 
0.057** 
(0.018) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.023 
(0.016) 
0.072*** 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Medicaid Expansion 
2017 (B) 
0.069*** 
(0.018)††† 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
0.078*** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Medicaid Expansion 
2018 (B) 
0.067*** 
(0.018) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.032 
(0.018)  
0.084*** 
(0.009)  
0.002 
(0.002) 
PANEL III: Full ACA  
Full ACA 2014 
(A+B) 
0.061*** 
(0.004) 
0.028*** 
(0.005) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
Full ACA 2015 
(A+B) 
0.094*** 
(0.006) 
0.032*** 
(0.006) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.066*** 
(0.008) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
Full ACA 2016 
(A+B) 
0.108*** 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.080*** 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Full ACA 2017 
(A+B) 
0.108*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.008) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.086*** 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.001) 
Full ACA 2018 
(A+B) 
0.105*** 
(0.006)  
0.023*** 
(0.006)†† 
0.015 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.087*** 
(0.008)  
0.002 
(0.002) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in 
parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Statistically significantly 
different effect in 2017 and 2018 relative to 2016 is denoted by ††† at 0.1% level, †† at 1% level and † at 5% level. 
All regressions include area and time fixed effects, the full set of controls. 
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Table 3.5: Implied Effects of ACA on Health Care Access – Robustness Checks 
 Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer-
sponsored 
Individuall
y purchased 
Medicaid Other 
Panel I: Exclude 19-25 Year Olds 
ACA without 
Medicaid Expansion  
0.037** 
(0.012) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.027 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.047*** 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
0.057*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
ACA with Medicaid 
Expansion  
0.084*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
0.016** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.061*** 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Panel II: Drop ACA Early Expanders Version 1 
ACA without 
Medicaid Expansion  
0.038** 
(0.012) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.027 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.045** 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
0.054*** 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
ACA with Medicaid 
Expansion  
0.083*** 
(0.009) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.060*** 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Panel III: Drop ACA Early Expanders Version 2 
ACA without 
Medicaid Expansion  
0.037** 
(0.012) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.027 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.048*** 
(0.013) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
ACA with Medicaid 
Expansion  
0.085*** 
(0.007) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
0.067*** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Panel IV: 13 Treatment States and 16 Control States without a Medicaid Expansion Before 2014 
ACA without 
Medicaid Expansion  
0.038** 
(0.014) 
0.035** 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.028 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.052** 
(0.017) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
0.068*** 
(0.019) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
ACA with Medicaid 
Expansion  
0.090*** 
(0.010) 
0.027** 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.073*** 
(0.018) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
Panel V: Drop ACA Late Expanders 
ACA without 
Medicaid Expansion  
0.037** 
(0.011) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.027 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.056*** 
(0.013) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
0.066*** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
ACA with Medicaid 
Expansion  
0.093*** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.071*** 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Panel VI: Drop All Early and Late Expanders   
ACA without 
Medicaid Expansion  
0.038* 
(0.014) 
0.035** 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.028 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.057** 
(0.018) 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
0.086*** 
(0.018) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
ACA with Medicaid 
Expansion  
0.095*** 
(0.010) 
0.018 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.008) 
0.091*** 
(0.017) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Panel VII: Include Medicaid-Uninsurance Rate in DDD Analysis   
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ACA without 
Medicaid Expansion  
0.037** 
(0.012) 
0.033** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.027 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.053*** 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
0.062 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
ACA with Medicaid 
Expansion  
0.091*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
0.018 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.003) 
0.068 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Panel VIII: State Level Uninsurance Rate with additional State Controls   
ACA without 
Medicaid Expansion  
0.054*** 
(0.011) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
0.018* 
(0.008) 
0.022* 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.038*** 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.037*** 
(0.010) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
ACA with Medicaid 
Expansion  
0.092*** 
(0.010) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.059*** 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically 
significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Sampling weights are used. All regressions include state*location 
type and year*location type fixed effects as well as the controls 
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